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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 15, 1987, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA)' declared Ohio State all-American wide receiver Cris
1. The NCAA is:
a private non-profit association organized in 1905. [The] NCAA consists of ap-
proximately 900 members. Membership is open to four-year institutions which
meet certain academic standards. Allied and Associate membership is open to
athletic conferences, associations and other groups interested in intercollegiate
athletics .... [The] NCAA operates pursuant to a Constitution and Bylaws
adopted by the membership and subject to amendment ... by the membership
at annual conventions. When the annual convention is not in session, policy is
established and directed by the NCAA council of 22 members elected by the
entire membership at the annual convention. [The] NCAA has a professional
staff located at its headquarters in Shawnee Mission, Kansas. Some 80 employ-
ees execute NCAA policy under the supervision of [an executive director].
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Carter ineligible to compete in intercollegiate athletics for ac-
cepting money from sports agent Norby Walters.2 With Carter in
the line-up as a junior the year before, the Buckeyes had compiled
a 9-3 record that included a victory over Texas A&M in the Cotton
Bowl.3 However, without Carter, Ohio State, which had been a pre-
season top ten pick, finished a disappointing 6-4-1." For the first
time in fifteen years, the Buckeyes did not play in a post-season
bowl. 5 Finally, five days before the team's final game against arch-
rival Michigan, head coach Earl Bruce was fired.' Bruce's firing
drew widespread criticism.7 Bruce countered with a $7.4 million
Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (W.D. Okla.
1982), afl'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
2. Eagles Nab Carter in Special Draft, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 5, 1987, at
D1, col. 5, D4, cols. 3-6. In three years at Ohio State, Carter caught 27 touchdowns, but also
admitted to having accepted $6800 in loans from Norby Walters. Id. Ohio State University
later decided not to appeal the NCAA decision in an attempt to restore Carter's eligibility.
Ohio State Won't Appeal on Carter, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 1, 1987, at 4C, cols. 4-
5. Ohio State University President Edward Jennings said Carter's financial aid would be
maintained so Carter could continue his studies at the university if he so chose. Id. How-
ever, Carter said he was disappointed by Ohio State's decision and would probably make
himself available for a National Football League supplemental draft. Id.
3. See Ohio State Won't Appeal on Carter, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 1, 1987,
at 4C, cols. 4-5. Carter was the Buckeyes' all-time leading pass catcher. Id.
4. Buckeye Record Has Coach Bruce Squarely on Spot, Courier-Post, Nov. 12, 1987,
at 7D. Some people felt that 1987 might have been the year Ohio State would contend for
its first national championship since the Rex Kern and Jack Tatum team of 1968. Id. The
Buckeyes' loss to Iowa was its third consecutive loss, and the Buckeyes' first to the
Hawkeyes at Ohio Stadium since 1959. Maryland Tips W. Chester to Win Field Hockey
Title, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 16, 1987, at 9C, col. 2.
5. Buckeye Record Has Coach Bruce Squarely on Spot, Courier-Post, Nov. 12, 1987,
at 7D. The Buckeyes made eight Bowl appearances during the nine seasons under the direc-
tion of head coach Earl Bruce. East Discovers a New Beast in '87, The Philadelphia In-
quirer, Nov. 27, 1987, at 8C, col. 1.
6. See Ohio State Fires Bruce; AD Resigns in Protest, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
Nov. 17, 1987, at 4C, col 3. That same day, State Athletic Director Rick Bay resigned in
protest. Id.
7. Ohio State Firing Draws Widespread Criticism, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov.
18, 1987, at 5D. "It's bad commentary obviously for our coaching profession when a guy who
wins a Cotton Bowl game last year and loses three or four games this year is out of a job,"
said Pennsylvania State coach Joe Paterno. Id. Bruce's chief rival also came to his aid.
"He's done everything in my judgment that a top football coach ought to do," said Michi-
gan's Bo Schembechler. "I think this has done irreparable damage, particularly to the pro-
fession." Id. Columbus radio stations were deluged with phone calls from fans, the majority
supporting Bruce and attacking Jennings' handling of the situation. Id. One ardent Buckeye
supporter even filed a lawsuit requesting a temporary restraining order to block the firing.
See Judge Throws Out Lawyer's Suit to Block Bruce's Firing, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
Nov. 24, 1987, at 3D. However, Franklin County Common Pleas Court Judge William T.
Gillie denied the request by Columbus attorney Phillip D. Cameron, an Ohio State graduate
and former Buckeye baseball player. Id.
1991]
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lawsuit against the Ohio school and its president.8 The suit was
later settled for an immediate payment of $471,000. e
It may be an overgeneralization to say that Walters' dealing
with Carter ultimately caused the demise of the once proud Buck-
eyes. If nothing else, the Walters/Carter affair did have an impact
on Ohio State football simply because the Buckeyes lost the ser-
vice of an all-American wide receiver.
What Carter did is nothing new.10 For years, college athletes
with eligibility remaining have dealt with agents." However, only
recently has it become evident just how pervasive these dealings
are, and how widespread the financial ramifications have become.
This Article analyzes the magnitude of the situation and how vari-
ous states address it.
II. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SITUATION
On December 16, 1987, college athletics were rocked by the
announcement that Atlanta sports agent Jim Abernethy,"2 in viola-
tion of NCAA rules, had signed seven college football players to
contracts before their eligibility had expired."3
8. Bruce Sues Ohio State Over Firing, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 23, 1987, at
10C, col. 1. Bruce filed a lawsuit claiming that he was wrongfully dismissed and that Jen-
nings slandered him in statements to reporters. Id. Jennings had not publicly disclosed why
Bruce was fired, but said that the decision to fire Bruce was his alone. At a news conference,
Jennings said that his decision to fire Bruce was difficult, but that he felt it was "the right
thing to do." Id.
9. Bruce Drops Suit in a Settlement with Ohio State, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
Nov. 28, 1987, at 5D, col. 1. The $471,000 represented the money Bruce could have expected
to receive if he had stayed at the school until his contract expired in June 1989. Id. Both
sides agreed not to pursue any further action against each other. Id. Bruce was paid less
than $90,000 annually as head football coach. Id. Bruce would have been entitled to about
$140,000 for the time remaining on the contract in effect when he was fired. Id. According to
a University attorney, the settlement included reimbursement for lost income from a TV
contract, a sporting equipment contract, miscellaneous clinics, health benefits, and an early-
retirement policy. Id.
10. In November 1987, two football players, Riccardo Ingram of Georgia Tech and
Tony Jeffrey of Texas Christian, lost their eligibility after it was revealed that they had had
dealings with sports agent Jim Abernethy. Agent Says He Signed 7 Collegians to Contracts,
The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 16, 1987, at 1F, col. 1. For a discussion of the Abernathy
affair, see infra notes 12-100 and accompanying text.
11. Rules Some Agents Play By: None, U.S.A. Today, Dec. 22, 1987, at 1C, col. 4.
According to George Kickliter, an agent who specializes in representing Auburn players,
there were 1200 agents before the NFL players' union ruled that agents had to pay $200 for
certification. "Suddenly, we're down to 600," Kickliter said. "What's that telling you?" Id.
at 2C, cols. 1-7.
12. Id. at 1C, cols. 4-5. Abernethy is an Atlanta millionaire, who attempted to take the
sports agency business by storm. Id.
13. Agent Says He Signed 7 Collegians to Contracts, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec.
16, 1987, at 1F, cola. 1-5. The seven college football players were Kevin Porter (Auburn
[Vol. 8:1
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The disclosure by Abernethy cost three of these college ath-
letes their eligibility. 4 Within a day, Auburn University officials
announced that junior cornerback Kevin Porter, an all-Southeast-
ern Conference player, would be barred from further competition
starting with the Tigers' Sugar Bowl game against Syracuse on
January 1, 1988.1 Memphis State officials, having heard about the
newspaper report in advance, had already ruled two nights earlier
that a pair of starters on their basketball team, junior center Mar-
vin Alexander and sophomore forward Sylvester Gray, were
ineligible."'
Abernethy identified the other four players who allegedly
signed contracts as offensive tackle Tony Bartley and fullback
Melvin Collins of Texas A&M, and defensive back John Booty and
wide receiver Wayne Waddy of Texas Christian University.
7
Waddy, a junior, lost his senior season of eligibility at Texas Chris-
tian University while Booty, a senior, had already completed his
college career. 8 Bartley and Collins were declared ineligible for the
Aggies' Cotton Bowl matchup against Notre Dame on January 1,
1988."9 Abernethy later stated that the then Texas A&M football
coach Jackie Sherrill tried to negotiate a quick financial settlement
in an apparently futile effort to get two of his players back on the
team in time for the Cotton Bowl.20
University), Tony Bartley (Texas A&M), Melvin Collins (Texas A&M), John Booty (Texas
Christian University), Wayne Waddy (Texas Christian University), and basketball players
Marvin Alexander (Memphis State University) and Sylvester Gray (Memphis State Univer-
sity). Id. at col. 3. Abernethy gave the Atlanta Journal-Constitution copies of all but one of
the contracts. Id. at col. 5. He said his contract with Collins was locked in a.safe-deposit
box, but that he could produce it on request. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id. Abernethy said he believed that he paid Porter about $1000 a month, plus
bonuses. Alabama Grand Jury Indicts Sports Agent, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 12,
1988, at 8D, col 1.
16. Agent Says He Signed 7 Collegians to Contracts, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec.
16, 1987, at 1F, col. 3.
17. Then Texas A&M coach Jackie Sherrill stated that the school was investigating
the matter, but added, "We don't think either one of our players signed anything with any-
body." Id. at col. 5.
18. Id. at col. 4. It is against NCAA rules for players to accept benefits from agents or
to sign contracts with them. Id. Before the NCAA will consider restoring a player's eligibil-
ity, all money must be repaid to the agent and the player released from his contract. Id.
19. Sports in Brief, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 19, 1987, at 3C, col. 3. Texas
A&M football coach Jackie Sherrill said, "This is the biggest game of their lives. You're
taking away the Cotton Bowl from these boys." Id.
20. Id. Abernethy said he had agreed to a settlement with Sherrill on the release of his
contract with the two Aggies players who lost their eligibility, and that he signed a release in
lieu of receiving a settlement of $5600 for money he gave to Melvin Collins and $1500 for
money he gave to Tony Bartley. A & M Pair Must Pay for Mistake, U.S.A. Today, Decem-
1991]
5
McKenna and DiGiuseppe: Policing Sports Agents: The First Four Years
Published by Institutional Repository, 1991
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
Abernethy also said that either he or his former associate,
Gary Wilson, had dealings with Clemson defensive tackle Michael
Dean Perry, South Carolina wide receiver Sterling Sharpe, and Au-
burn defensive tackle Tracy Rocker.2' Perry, the brother of Chi-
cago Bears defensive tackle William "The Refrigerator" Perry, de-
nied making any oral or written agreement with Abernethy.22
Sharpe said he had no recollection of meeting with the agents.2"
Abernethy said Rocker was entertained at the agents' expense in
Atlanta, but Auburn officials cleared the player of any
wrongdoing. 4
Later, the University of Alabama discovered that the dealings
of basketball players Derrick McKey and Terry Coner with agents
cost the University of Alabama $253,447 in basketball receipts
from the 1987 NCAA tournament.2 5 The NCAA concluded that
based on the Southeastern Conference's revenue-sharing arrange-
ment, fifty percent of a school's share of money from NCAA cham-
pionships goes into the conference for distribution to other South-
her 22, 1987, at 1C, col. 3.
21. Agent Says He Signed 7 Collegians to Contracts, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec.
16, 1987, at iF, col. 3.
22. Id. at 5F, col. 6. Recruiter Fred Gibbs delivered Perry to a meeting in Gibbs' office
in Augusta. Rules Some Agents Play By: None, U.S.A. Today, Dec. 22, 1987, at 2C, col. 4.
Gibbs insisted Perry and Abernethy never talked contract. Id. "I always talked contract,"
Abernethy said. Id. "The idea was once you got them in the room, not to let them out until
they signed. I didn't drive up from Atlanta just to chat." Id. Perry insists there was no such
meeting. Id. Perry said he met Abernethy at a steak house and briefly chatted with him. Id.
According to NCAA rules, any of the three versions of the meeting fell within the rules, as
long as no money changed hands and no contract was signed. Id. Abernethy, however,
thought he was putting one over on the NCAA, and was almost hurt when he was told the
NCAA considered his Perry escapade perfectly legitimate. Id. at cols. 4-5.
23. Agent Says He Signed 7 Collegians to Contracts, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec.
16, 1987, at IF, col. 3. However, Terrence Flagler, now with the San Francisco 49ers, had a
vivid recollection of Abernethy while at Clemson. Id. He tells of Abernethy and three assist-
ants showing up at his hotel room the night before the Gator Bowl. Rules Some Agents Play
By: None, U.S.A. Today, Dec. 22, 1987, at 2C, cols. 3-4. "I thought from the very start he
wasn't very professional; I could tell he wasn't being honest," Flagler said. Id. "I'd already
met another guy I thought wasn't very honest, Norby Walters." Id. Flagler's dealings with
Walters were the subject of a suit in New York, wherein Walters sought to recover money
paid to Flagler. Id.
24. Agent Says He Signed 7 Collegians to Contracts, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec.
16, 1987, at IF, col. 3. NCAA spokesman Jim Marchiony told the Associated Press that "it's
up to the schools to do something first" about the players in question. Id. at 5F. "If what
[Abernethy] says is true, the normal procedure is to declare the player ineligible and then
appeal to the NCAA Eligibility Committee for reinstatement." Id.
25. Id. McKey, the Southeast Conference player of the year as a junior, was declared
ineligible for his senior season after his dealings with New York sports agent Norby Walters
were revealed. Id. He then entered the NBA draft and was picked in the first round by the
Seattle SuperSonics. Id. Coner was also linked to Walters, but by then he had already com-
pleted his senior season at Alabama. Id.
[Vol. 8:1
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eastern Conference members, and that the participating school
keeps fifty percent.26
Abernethy said the reasons for his decision to go public about
his activities were the following: (1) his religious experience with
the Pentecostal Church; (2) an ongoing investigation by the news-
paper; (3) the "hypocrisy" of the NCAA; and (4) his opinion that
"athletes are total con artists. 2 7 In an interview with the Associ-
ated Press, he declared that "every [sports] agency in the country
[was] doing it.. . . You have no idea how big this is. This is just
the beginning.""'
Abernethy's estimate was criticized by many of America's top
agents,2" who claim that no more than twenty-five percent of col-
lege players are on some agent's payroll.,30 Super-agent Leigh
Steinberg believes the figure is twenty to twenty-five percent.3 1
The grand jury investigation into the Norby Walters and Lloyd
Bloom situation "has gotten a high level of publicity. . .[and] has
sent up a warning flag for parents and the players themselves."32
However, NCAA's Rick Evrard stated, "I'd be guessing if I put a
figure on it. The more reputable agents give a lower number." 33
Tony Argonne, an agent for over ten years,34 expressed:
Every year, there's going to be [twenty] percent you don't have
a shot at. Those kids have made their deals, taken their money,
driving their cars.. . . I don't pay players.. . . As soon as it gets
to that, I tell them I don't pay. Then I give them the names of a
few guys who [do]-and damn if one of them doesn't end up
being their agent.3 5
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rules Some Agents Play By: None, U.S.A. Today, Dec. 22, 1987, at 2C, cols. 3-4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. For a complete discussion of the Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom prosecution,
see infra notes 124-60 and accompanying text.
33. Rules Some Agents Play By: None, U.S.A. Today, Dec. 22, 1987, at 2C, cols. 3-4.
34. Id.
35. Id. Argonne, a self-proclaimed honest agent, claims that 60 of the top football
players each year are gone when he inquires as to the athlete's representation. Id. Aberne-
thy was the type of agent who paid players. Id. at col. 2. In February 1986, Abernethy went
to the NFL scouting combine, a three-day tryout used to review potential professional play-
ers. Id. "Minutes after the last sprint of the day, Abernethy was in tears and on the tele-
phone with his public relations man in New York. In his eyes, he had played fair and lost.
Abernethy was too late. All the deals, the illegal cash deals, were done deeds. Consequently,
Abernethy was not a big-time player in the 1986 NFL draft." Id. at cols. 2-3. Determined
not to be beaten again, after the 1987 bowl games, Abernethy sent Assistant Gary Williams
sneaking onto campuses, handing out cash. Id. "I wasn't comfortable with it," Abernathy
1991]
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Another.successful agent, Mike Trope, proclaimed that he "never
saw the rule book. . . . I was making loans to players when some-
one brought up that it might be breaking the rules. I had no idea if
it was or wasn't." 6
If it only takes a few rotten apples to ruin a barrel, then the
sports agent business is rotten to the core. For instance, Abernethy
had contracts with seven college football players.3 7 If forty-nine of
the six hundred agents signed seven college football players, that
would be enough to cover the entire NFL draft.38
"C'mon, that's the way they all operate," Abernethy stated.
"The kids just ask and ask. And we pay and pay."39 But Trope
disagreed, stating: "Not everybody pays-it is just that nearly eve-
rybody cheats. ' 40 Finally, Trope declared that the NCAA was not
blameless: 41
You take this rancid lettuce that's three weeks old. It smells and
it isn't going to taste good. But you put all the other things on it
and you pour lots of blue cheese dressing on it and you can
make it look good. But when you try to eat it, it still is going to
make you sick. For years, the NCAA has been the salad dressing
for college football.42
III. ALABAMA AND UNLAWFUL AGENTS: ONE STATE'S ANSWER
A. Introduction
"If you go to Alabama, don't offer any bribes to these young
people. Don't pass them any money under the table, because
their attorney general will try to put you in jail or have you con-
victed and have you washing cars at the state trooper post. 143
Alabama Attorney General Don Siegelman issued this warning
to athlete agents and his threat has been enforced." Jim Aberne-
said in retrospect, "but I was convinced that was how business was done." Id. at col. 3. The
spending spree included meetings in out-of-the-way places, trips to Puerto Rico for players,
as well as entertaining families and friends of athletes at plush hotels. Id.
36. Technically, handing out cash did not become "wrong" until a few years ago. Id.
By that time, however, Trope had entered into other business ventures. Id.
37. Id. at col. 6.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Quote of the Day, U.S.A. Today, May 9, 1988, at 9C, cols. 1-2.
44. Alabama Grand Jury Indicts Sports Agent, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 12,
1988, at 8D, col. 1. For investigative purposes, Siegelman also contacted the federal prosecu-
[Vol. 8:1
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thy and Lloyd Bloom are living proof that if you get caught bribing
an Alabama college athlete, the Alabama Attorney General's office
will try to put you in jail or make you do a lot of washing and
waxing.' 5 Bloom, Norby Walters' former partner, pleaded guilty to
an incident involving payments to two University of Alabama bas-
ketball players during the 1986-87 season.46 As a result, he was
sentenced to seven days of washing state trooper cars in
Tuscaloosa.' 7
On January 12, 1988, a grand jury in Opelika, Alabama, in-
dicted Abernethy on misdemeanor counts of tampering with a
sports event, violating the Deceptive-Practices Act, and commer-
cial bribery.' 8 The indictment was handed down after Abernethy
had previously confirmed that he paid performance bonuses to Au-
burn defensive back Kevin Porter.'9
At the time, Attorney General Siegelman said his office was
doing everything it could "to get Jim Abernethy before a judge and
jury."5 Less than two months later, Siegelman accomplished his
goal. In the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama, a jury found
Abernethy guilty of a misdemeanor tampering charge and sen-
tenced him to one year in jail and a $2000 fine.51
tor in Chicago who had been investigating legal issues involving athletes and sports agents,
including New York agent Norby Walters. Id.
45. Id.
46. Quote of the Day, U.S.A. Today, May 9, 1991, at 9C, cols. 1-2.
47. Id.
48. Abernethy v. State, 545 So. 2d 185, 187 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). Abernethy was
indicted for commercial bribery in violation of ALA. CODE § 13A-11-120 (1975), unlawful
trade practice in violation of ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (1975), and tampering with a sports contest
in violation of ALA. CODE § 13A-11-148 (1975).
The indictment charged as follows:
Abernethy ... did with intent to influence the outcome of a sports contest, to-
wit: an intercollegiate football game of Auburn University's 1987 football season,
knowingly tamper with a sports participant, to-wit: one Kevin Porter, a football
player for Auburn University, in a manner contrary to the rules and usages pur-
porting to govern the sports contest in question, to-wit: by providing said player
with monetary consideration pursuant to a contract relating to said player's ath-
letic performance and athletic services, in violation of the governing rules of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association and its Constitution, in violation of §
13A-11-143, Alabama Code 1975.
Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 187.
49. After his indictment, Abernethy could not be reached for comment. However, he
had stated earlier that the grand jury investigation "sound[ed] like sour grapes from Auburn
fans who wanted Porter in the Sugar Bowl." Alabama Grand Jury Indicts Sports Agent,
The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 12, 1988, at 8D, col. 1.
50. Id.
51. Id. After deliberating nearly 21/ hours, the jury of seven women and five men
convicted Abernethy of tampering with a sports event. Id. The jury also found Abernethy
not guilty of the two other misdemeanor charges of commercial bribery and violation of
1991)
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The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convic-
tion, noting it was "a case of first impression."5 The court held
that paying a collegiate athlete for entering into a representation
agreement with an agent did not constitute "tamper[ing] with a
sports contest." 3 In addition, the court concluded that a violation
of the NCAA rules and regulations did not, by itself, constitute
criminal tampering with a sports contest, unless the violation
tended to influence the final score of a game."'
B. The Abernethy Decision
1. The Facts
A review of the Abernethy opinion demonstrates that the facts
of the case were just as crucial as the law.55 In 1987, Porter was an
outstanding football player attending Auburn University on a foot-
ball scholarship.56 He was also ranked the number one cornerback
in the nation. On August 3, 1987, just before the beginning of his
senior year at Auburn, Porter signed a three-year contract with
Abernethy in Abernethy's Atlanta office. 5 According to the con-
tract, Abernethy agreed to "represent [Porter] in the negotiation of
deceptive trade laws. Id. See supra note 48.
52. Abernathy, 545 So. 2d at 186. The Abernethy court neither cited nor found any
reported case involving the conviction of a sports agent. Id. at 187.
53. Id. at 191.
54. Id. at 187. The crime of tampering with a sports contest is defined as follows:
(a) A person commits the crime of tampering with a sports contest if, with intent
to influence the outcome of a sports contest, he:
(1) Tampers with any sports participant or sports official, or with any
animal, equipment or other thing involved in the conduct or operation of a
sports contest, in a manner contrary to the rules and usages purporting to gov-
ern the sports contest in question; or
(2) Substitutes a sports participant, animal, equipment or other thing in-
volved in the conduct or operation of a sports contest for the genuine person,
animal or thing.
(b) Tampering with a sports contest is a Class A misdemeanor.
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-143 (1975).
55. During the course of the trial, the parties agreed to three stipulations. First, they
agreed that before the Abernethy case there had never been an attempted prosecution of
any sports agent in Alabama for affecting the eligibility of a student-athlete. Abernathy, 545
So. 2d at 186. Second, in the past, there had been numerous instances in Alabama where
student-athletes had violated NCAA rules and regulations and had been declared ineligible.
Id. at 187. Third, there had been instances where players had been discovered to have been
ineligible for accepting favors, signing with agents, or other reasons, only after the players
had either played all of their games, or after their ordinary period of eligibility had ended,
and there had been no prosecution of any athlete, sports agent, or third party. Id.
56. Id. at 186.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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professional sporting contracts and commercial endorsement
contracts." 9
Abernethy gave Porter $2000 as a "signing bonus," and was to
give Porter $900 each month, plus $400 for Thanksgiving and $500
for Christmas." Porter received $900 in September and October of
1987, but did not receive any additional funds or payments from
Abernethy because Abernethy went out of the sports agent
business. 1
Auburn University was a member of the NCAA62 and was gov-
erned by that organization's rules and regulations.6 3 Those rules
prohibited the 'professionalization' of a student athlete and pro-
vided that a player was not eligible to participate in a sport if
that player had 'ever taken pay, or the promise of pay for com-
peting in that sport or if the player had ever agreed to have an
agent market ... [that player's] athletic ability or reputation in
that sport.'""
The court stated that "[t]he contract between Abernethy and
Porter was in violation of N.C.A.A. rules and rendered Porter ineli-
gible to play football for Auburn."65 Porter had testified that play-
ers signing a contract with a sports agent should be declared ineli-
gible, but in fact they remain eligible after signing an agent
contract "pending that the University doesn't find out."6
On December 15, 1987, the University "found out," after an
article appeared in The Atlanta Constitution publicizing Aberne-
thy's activities involving Porter and several other college athletes.6 7
59. Id. The terms of the contract specified that Porter was to pay Abernethy 5% of his
base salary for each contract negotiated, and 10% of the endorsement fees negotiated by
Abernethy. Id. At trial, Porter testified that he needed money because his mother was finan-
cially strapped. Id. In return for representation by Abernethy, Porter agreed to "play ball."
Id.
60. Id. Porter was also to receive $100 for every pass he intercepted. Id.
61. Id. In November 1987, Abernethy dissolved his sports agency, Jim Abernethy
Sports, Inc. Id.
62. See supra note 1.
63. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 186.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Porter stated that Abernethy told him "never to tell anyone [about their rela-
tionship] because it would destroy his own reputation." Id.
67. Id. The article concerned a sports agent investigation conducted by reporter Chris
Mortenson. Id. At trial, Mortenson testified that one of the reasons Abernethy divulged his
activities was because Abernethy said he had a "religious experience." Id. Mortenson testi-
fied that, initially, Abernethy "vehemently denied involvement" with the players, but then
admitted that he "lied to protect the players," and that he "felt a real responsibility to the
athletes, a real loyalty, and [he] didn't want to see all of those kids hurt." Id.
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Porter played in all eleven of Auburn's 1987-88 season football
games even though he was technically ineligible.8 After publica-
tion of the newspaper article, however, Auburn declared Porter in-
eligible because of his dealings with Abernethy, and was not al-
lowed to participate in the 1988 Sugar Bowl.69
2. Analysis
As a preface, the Abernethy court noted that it had thor-
oughly and repeatedly reviewed and scrutinized the evidence that
the state presented against Abernethy for any fact, circumstance,
or inference of criminal intent. 0 In the court's own words, it was
"convinced that the State's evidence proved that Abernethy did
not have the requisite criminal intent in his association with
Porter."7 1
As a foundation for its analysis, the court stated that Aberne-
thy was convicted pursuant to Alabama Code section 13A-11-143,
which defined the crime of tampering with a sports contest.7 s The
court explained that a statute defining a crime must be strictly
construed, and that "one [could not] commit an offense under a
statute except in the circumstances it specifie[d]. ' 3
The Alabama court first noted that "the crime of tampering
with a sports contest require[d] proof that the tampering was done
'with the intent to influence the outcome of a sports contest.' ,,"
The court further defined the requisite element of intent: "A per-
son acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct de-
scribed by a statute defining an offense, when his purpose is to
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 187.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 54.
73. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 187 (citations omitted). The court adhered to the rules of
statutory construction set out in Clements v. State, 370 So. 2d 723, 725 (Ala. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala. 1980):
There are several long-settled rules of construction to which we are bound in our
review of this cause.. . . A basic rule of review in criminal cases is that criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of those persons sought to be sub-
jected to their operation, i.e., defendants. . . .Penal statutes are to reach no
further in meaning than their words. . . . One who commits an act which does
not come within the words of a criminal statute, according to the general and
popular understanding of those words, when they are not used technically, is not
to be punished thereunder, merely because the act may contravene the policy of
the statute.
Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 187 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 188. See ALA. CODE § 18A-11-143(a) (1975).
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cause that result or to engage in that conduct. '75 Moreover,
[i]n the context of this case, a violation of the N.C.A.A. rules
and regulations does not constitute the criminal offense of tam-
pering with a sports contest unless that violation was done 'with
the intent to influence the outcome of a sports contest.' Mere
tampering with a player's eligibility in violation of N.C.A.A.
rules is not a criminal offense unless done with the specific in-
tent to influence the outcome of a sports contest.
7 6
The court then wrestled with the definition of the word "out-
come" 77 before construing the phrase "outcome of a sports event"
as used in the Alabama statute and in connection with a football
game to mean the final score of the game.7 In resolving this issue,
the court stated: "Observing the previously stated rules of statu-
tory construction, and there being no indication that the Alabama
Legislature intended otherwise, we do not interpret the term 'out-
come of a sports contest' to include the playing statistics of any
individual football player. 79
The state argued before the appellate court that the prosecu-
tion had sufficiently proven Abernethy's criminal intent under two
different theories."0 First, the state maintained that evidence of in-
tent was supplied by Abernethy's knowledge of the NCAA rules
prohibiting the professionalization of college athletes.81 The court
75. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 188 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(1) (1975)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 187. Because the word "outcome" was not defined by statute, it must be
given its "natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning." Alabama Farm Bu-
reau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So. 2d 1219, 1223 (Ala. 1984). An
"outcome" is "[a] natural result, consequence." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 932 (1969). It is "something that comes out of or follows from an activity
or process." WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1601 (1971).
78. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 188.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The state explained its position in the following manner:
Appellant thus intended for Porter to play, even though ineligible, and re-af-
firmed this intention with every payment made thereafter. As a direct result of
Appellant's actions, Auburn University did play an ineligible player the entire
regular season and, consequently, each of those games were [sic] subject to for-
feiture under NCAA rules. Abernethy was aware of these rules and obviously
was aware of the risk of forfeiture of these games. He clearly intended for Au-
burn University to play an ineligible player, which act in turn created the possi-
ble result of an automatic loss through forfeiture of each game of that particular
season. This may have not been the intended consequence, but it was certainly a
possible consequence of the Appellant's intended act.
Id. at 188 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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dismissed this theory as unreasonable:8 2
Pursuant to the law under which Abernethy was prosecuted, it
was not a criminal offense to intend for Auburn to play an ineli-
gible player unless there also existed an intent to thereby influ-
ence the final score of the game. Without the specific criminal
intent of the statute, even an intentional violation of the
N.C.A.A. rules resulting in a player being declared ineligible
does not constitute the offense of tampering with a sports
contest. 8
The court found that Alabama's first theory was based on possibil-
ity, speculation, and unfounded conjecture, and not on a legitimate
inference from the evidence."' "[No rule is more fundamental or
better settled than that convictions cannot be predicated upon
surmise, speculation, and suspicion to establish the accused's crim-
inal agency in the offense charged. '85
The second theory advanced by the state to prove Abernethy's
intent was found in Abernethy's offer "to 'purchase' additional in-
terceptions with a reward of bonus money for such achieve-
ments."88 Specifically, the state argued:
The most apparent evidence of his intent is that he promised to
give 'incentives' of $100.00 to Porter for each interception he
made. The Defendant told Chris Mortenson that he provided
these 'incentives' to give him an advantage over other agents
and added that he should benefit from these plays as the N.F.L.
teams do. Essentially, the Defendant was purchasing intercep-
tions or glamour plays, to increase Porter's and his other client's
draft value, thus increasing the money he would receive upon
Porter's signing an N.F.L. contract.87
The court also found this theory unpersuasive "because, like the
82. Id.
83. Id. The court further stated:
It makes no difference if it does appear that appellant's conduct primarily was
the cause of the unfortunate occurrence, for the law does not countenance the
conviction of any person for an offense not contemplated, intended, or commit-
ted by him, and of which he had no knowledge that the offense was about to be
committed.
Id. at 188-89 (quoting Rogers v. State, 23 Ala. App. 149, 150, 122 So. 308 (1929)).
84. Id. at 189 (citation omitted). The Abernethy court explained that "[an inference
can be drawn only from facts, and mere possibilities will not sustain a legitimate inference."
Id. (citation omitted). "[Tihe possibility that a thing may 6ccur is not alone evidence even
circumstantially, that the thing did occur." Id. (citation omitted).
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id. (citations omitted).
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first theory, it simply did not support a legitimate inference that
Abernethy intended to influence the outcome of a sports
contest."88
The court explained that not only had Alabama failed to prove
that Abernethy had the requisite criminal intent, but the state's
own witnesses proved that Abernethy had no criminal intent.8 9 In
return for his representation by Abernethy and the financial bene-
fits, Porter only agreed to "play ball."90 According to the court,
Porter had testified that both he and Abernethy intended for him
to play every game that Auburn scheduled for the 1897 football
season, and that his contract with Abernethy had no effect on his
playing performance."'
Having examined the evidence under the principles for review-
ing convictions based on circumstantial evidence, the court con-
cluded that the evidence presented by the state was insufficient to
afford the jury any reasonable inference that the crime of tamper-
ing with a sports contest had been committed. e According to the
88. Id. If anything, the court noted that the second theory, like the first, showed that
Abernethy intended for Porter to play every game and that having Porter declared ineligible
would be against Abernethy's own financial interest and frustrate the very purpose of the
agent contract. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 189-90. The record showed that Porter testified as follows on cross-examina-
tion by defense counsel:
Q. Kevin, let me ask you this: Suppose you had never met Jim Abernethy, and
suppose that you had never had any dealings at all with any kind of sports
agent, wouldn't you have done your very best in every game that you played
with Auburn University in 1987?
A. Definitely.
Q. Did you in fact, play your very best in every game that you played for Auburn
University?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And wasn't that exactly what you and Jim Abernethy wanted?
A. Yes.
Q. So, then, Kevin, wouldn't it be true, that the contract that you signed with
Jim Abernethy did not hurt your performance in any of the Auburn football
games?
A. Not at all.
Q. You still did your best, didn't you?
A. Very best.
Q. In fact, the contract that you signed with Abernethy Sports had no effect,
whatsoever, on your game play performance, did it?
A. None.
Id. at 189.
92. Id. at 190. The court explained the rationale for its conclusion in the following
manner:
Intent, we know, being a state or condition of the mind, is rarely, if ever, suscep-
tible of direct or positive proof, and must usually be inferred from the facts
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court, the fundamental reason for reversing Abernethy's conviction
was that the crime of tampering with a sports contest did not and
was not intended to embrace the particular agent contract issue
presented to the court in this case.93 Although the Alabama Ath-
lete Agents Regulatory Act of 198794 was designed to control and
regulate the activities of sports agents, it did not specifically pro-
hibit or make criminal the making of a sports contract with a stu-
dent-athlete.9 5 Under the Act, "[n]o person shall engage in or carry
on the occupation of an athlete agent either within the state or
with a resident of the state without first registering with the [Ala-
bama Athlete Agent Regulatory] commission. "6 The Act provided
that the Commission may refuse to grant, revoke, or suspend the
registration of any athlete agent applicant who had "engaged in
conduct which violate[d] or cause[d] a student-athlete to violate
any rule or regulation promulgated by the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association governing student-athletes and their relationship
with athlete agents. '9 7 A violation of any provision of the act con-
stitutes a Class C felony "punishable by a fine of not more than
testified to by witnesses and the circumstances as developed by the evidence.
However, "[i]ntent can only be shown by facts and circumstances from which
the jury is authorized to draw the inference. There must be a guilty scienter
before a defendant can be convicted of crime, and this must be established by
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. It is very true that to constitute a
crime, there must be both an act and an intent. . . . [I]ntent . . . mean[s] the
state of mind of any person at the time he does the act-the act together with
such state of mind constituting the charged crime. A wrongful act and a wrong-
ful intent must concur, to constitute what the law deems a crime."
In determining whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction, "the basic question must be whether or not the evidence adduced is
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis that the
[defendant] is innocent. . . . [I]f circumstantial evidence fairly permits an infer-
ence consistent with innocence, it will not support a conviction."
Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. Even the trial judge recognized this when, in response to defense counsel's mo-
tion for a judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's evidence, he stated: "[Ilt's
obvious to me that these statutes have been stretched to almost the breaking point in order
to try to embrace the Defendant's conduct within the four corners of these statutes. And I
have some doubts as to whether or not any one of these statutes apply [sic]." Id.
94. Ironically, the Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act of 1987 became effective on
the same day the contract between Porter and Abernathy was signed. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-
26-1 to -41 (1975 & Supp. 1988).
95. See ALA. CODE § 8-26-23 (1975) ("The contract shall contain, in close proximity to
the signature of the athlete, a notice in at least 10-point type stating that the athlete may
jeopardize his or her standing as an amateur athlete by entering into the contract.") The
Act does provide that "[a]ny and all contracts to be utilized by athlete agents shall be on a
form approved by the commission." ALA. CODE § 8-26-22 (1975).
96. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 190 (citing ALA. CODE § 8-26-4 (1975)).
97. Id. (citing ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-7(a)(4), -8 (1975)).
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$5,000.00 or imprisonment for a period of not less than one year
nor more than [ten] years, or both.'"98
In closing, the court noted that it had not been called upon to
decide whether Abernethy was guilty of violating any of the provi-
sions of the Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act.99 Rather, the
court concluded:
The State utterly and completely failed to prove that Abernethy
tampered with a sports contest with the criminal intent to influ-
ence its outcome. Because the State had the opportunity but
failed to develop a case that warranted submission to a jury, this
case must be reversed. Because this reversal is the result of an
insufficiency of the evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause pre-
vents Abernethy's retrial.'00
IV. THE NCAA FIGHTS BACK
The same day that the Alabama grand jury indicted Aberne-
thy, NCAA executive director Dick Schultz declared that the
NCAA would soon require college athletes to submit sworn affida-
vits stating they had not signed agreements with agents. 10' As a
result, if someone who signed an affidavit also signed with agents,
the NCAA would likely sue both the athletes and the agents.102
Four months earlier, the NCAA took steps to encourage coop-
eration with athletes who had dealt with agents in violation of
NCAA rules.' 03 This occurred when the NCAA Eligibility Commit-
tee voted to restore the eligibility of University of Pittsburgh de-
fensive back Teryl Austin, a senior who acknowledged taking
money from Norby Walters. 0 4 Austin thus became the first stu-
dent-athlete permitted by the NCAA to resume his collegiate ca-
reer after prematurely taking money from or signing a contract
with a sports agent. 10 5
98. Id. at 191 (citing ALA. CODE § 8-26-41 (1975)).
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)).
101. Alabama Grand Jury Indicts Sports Agent, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 12,
1988, at 8D, col. 1.
102. Id. The requirement was later implemented just in time for the NCAA basketball
tournament in March 1988. Id.
103. NCAA Reinstates a Player Who Took Agent's Money, The Philadelphia In-
quirer, Aug. 27, 1987, at 4C.
104. Id.
105. Id. "By taking this action, we hope we can encourage student-athletes who have
signed with agents to come forward with the knowledge that the eligibility committee will
consider restoring a substantial part of their remaining eligibility," stated Lew Cryer, the
chairman of the Eligibility Committee and Commissioner of the Pacific Coast Athletic Asso-
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Based in part on the action by the NCAA to restore the eligi-
bility of Teryl Austin, the University of Texas decided to appeal
the NCAA decision declaring football and track star James Lott
ineligible because he accepted cash from a sports agent. 0 6 Texas
declared Lott, a senior defensive back and high-jumper, ineligible
after learning that he accepted $800 from professional sports agent
Lloyd Bloom in September 1986.107 The NCAA concurred with the
University's action, but gave the school the right to appeal.108
In another move aimed at curtailing the signing of underclass-
men, the NCAA began withholding revenues.10 9 For example, the
NCAA withheld $633,616 in post-season basketball tournament re-
ceipts for the University of Alabama pending a review of the
school's use of two players who took money from an agent.110 Ala-
bama and NCAA officials stated that the funds were put on hold
after junior center Derrick McKey and senior guard Terry Coner
conceded that in April 1986 they accepted money from agent
Norby Walters."' According to NCAA Assistant Executive Direc-
tor for Enforcement, David Berst, the issue was whether "the
funds should be forfeited because ineligible players participated.
1 2
The University of Alabama had its case heard by the NCAA Exec-
utive Committee in December 1987.118 The Committee ruled
against Alabama and the university forfeited the money."' If Ala-
bama had won the case, it would have received half of the funds
and the Southeastern Conference would have received half.15
V. THE NORBY WALTERS-LLOYD BLOOM SCANDAL
A. The Brent Fullwood Case
The Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom scandal represents per-
ciation. Id.
106. The Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 3, 1987, at 4C.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. See supra note 25.
112. Id.
113. Id. At the time, Berst suggested that the Committee could rule that Alabama
forfeit the money, or that the school could receive all or part of the amount. Id.
114. Id. Telephone interview with Richard Hilliard, Director of Enforcement for the
NCAA (July 2, 1991).
115. Id. Later, the University of Alabama and Norby Walters settled their dispute for
$200,000 in exchange for the dismissal of criminal charges against Walters. In the World of
Sports Agents It's Business as Usual, The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 13, 1988, at Cl, col.
5.
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haps the most flagrant example of the corruption and greed ram-
pant in college athletics today. The uproar began slowly in the
form of a simple state court contracts case before mushrooming
into a federal matter when a district court voided a contract be-
tween former Auburn University running back Brent Fullwood and
agent Norby Walters, and dismissed Walters' $500,000 lawsuit
against Fullwood. 1" 6
At the time, Fullwood's new representative, George Kickliter,
thought the ruling might curtail the number of campus-trotting
agents who sign college athletes with eligibility remaining:
This is a significant thing, a landmark decision for other states.
... It conceivably could have a real big impact on the agent
problem. It'll affect a lot of people and certainly tend to reduce
the number of so-called agents who sign athletes with these
methods. It'll do a lot more good than so-called state
legislation. 117
B. The Ronnie Harmon Arbitration
The avalanche continued to bear down on Walters when an
arbitrator ruled that running back Ronnie Harmon of the NFL's
Buffalo Bills did not have to repay Walters the nearly $50,000 that
was given to Harmon when he was a junior at the University of
Iowa."' The arbitrator's decision held that Harmon must repay
only $5,869.47 of the $454,924.42 that Walters gave the player in
the form of cash, airline tickets, and a car," 9 and that the $50,000
was part of a contract that would be void under the NFL Players'
Association rules.120
C. The Big Ten Conference Settlement
In an attempt to cut their losses, Walters and Bloom settled a
lawsuit filed against them by the Big Ten Conference.' 2' The Big
Ten had filed suit seeking to prohibit Bloom and Walters from
dealing with its athletes, and requesting damages if it could not
116. Sports in Brief, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 20, 1987, at 17D, col. 4.
117. Id.
118. Sports in Brief, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 5, 1987, at 7C, col. 4.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Sports in Brief, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 24, 1987, at 4D, col. 6. Bloom
later stated that the settlement was "meaningless" because he had decided to concentrate
on representing Hollywood entertainers instead of athletes. Id.
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stop the contacts. 2 ' Under the settlement agreement, the two
could not sign eligible Big Ten Conference athletes without notify-
ing the League and the schools involved. 123
D. The Federal Indictment
In May 1987, Walters and Bloom were charged in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in a
seven-count indictment, with mail fraud, conspiracy, and RICO vi-
olations.1 24 Count I, charging conspiracy, alleged that from early
1981 to December 1987, Walters and Bloom misrepresented their
professional status in the following manner:
[D]efendants Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom assured each stu-
dent-athlete that through their joint efforts at concealing the ex-
istence of the representation agreement, the date it was actually
signed, and the monies paid by defendants [] to the student-
athlete, no one, including representatives of the student-ath-
lete's school, would find out that the student-athlete was no
longer eligible to compete in intercollegiate athletics in his sport
as a result of his having signed a representation agreement with
and taken money from the agent.123
The indictment also charged Walters and Bloom, as well as
the participating student-athletes, with falsely certifying that the
students had complied with the NCAA's rules.126 The NCAA's
rules require that any student-athlete who agrees to be represented
by an agent concerning the athlete's sports abilities forfeits his or
her eligibility to compete in the particular sport in which the ath-
lete participated. 127 The NCAA's rules also forbid the acceptance
of money, the promise of money, or any financial assistance related
to the student's athletic ability.'28
To enforce these rules, the NCAA requires every student-ath-
lete participating in intercollegiate athletics to sign and submit to
the NCAA a statement identifying all forms of financial assistance
the athlete receives.' 9 The student must also certify that he or she
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'g 704 F. Supp. 844
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
125. Indictment at 8, United States v. Walters, 704 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd,
913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Indictment].
126. Id.
127. Id. at 10-12.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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is currently complying with the NCAA's rules. 30 Any falsification
or deliberate omission of representation of the college athlete by a
sports agent forfeits the student's eligibility to compete in intercol-
legiate athletics or receive an athletic scholarship. 13
Walters and Bloom were also charged with extortion3 2 and
with defrauding the student-athletes' schools. The fraud consisted
of allowing the schools to provide financial assistance to the stu-
dent-athletes based on false representations made to the football
players' respective schools.133
In furtherance of the conspiracy, the indictment also charged
that Walters and Bloom solicited noted college football players to
sign representation agreements. 34 These agreements allowed Wal-
ters' corporation, World Sports & Entertainment,' 35 to represent
the student-athlete in its negotiations with professional teams. 36
In return, the agents would receive a commission.3 ' To entice
these college football players into signing with World Sports & En-
130. Id.
131. The student-athlete forfeits eligibility to participate in an intercollegiate sport if
the student-athlete agrees, whether "orally or in writing, to be represented by an agent in
the marketing of the individual's athletic ability or reputation in a sport." NCAA Const.
Act. III, Section 1(c). No student-athlete may accept anything of material value from an
agent without losing his or her eligibility. NCAA Const. Act III, Section 1(a)(l), (3). How-
ever, a student-athlete may consult with an attorney concerning a proposed professional
sports contract as long as the attorney does not represent the student-athlete during the
negotiations of such contract. NCAA Const. Act III, Section 1(c).
132. Walters and Bloom violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 894, 1951 (1987). The indictment also
charged Walters and Bloom with using organized crime connections to obtain entertainment
clients by extortion. The indictment alleged Walters and Bloom used Michael Franzese, an
alleged member of a New York City organized crime family, to intimidate entertainment
figures into business deals with Walter and Bloom. Indictment at 5. The indictment specifi-
cally cited an attempt by Walters and Bloom to become the booking agent for the 1981
Jackson Five Tour. Indictment at 5-6. When the group's manager rejected Walters and
Bloom by selecting another booking agent, Walters and Franzese threatened the manager.
Walters and Franzese told the group's manager that they were going to be involved in the
upcoming Jackson Five tour or "there would be no tour." Indictment at 6.
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1987).
134. Indictment at 6-9.
135. According to the indictment, World Sports & Entertainment was
organized as a corporation under the laws of the State of New York and was
engaged primarily in the business of recruiting highly-rated college athletes
whom they would represent in the negotiation of professional sports contracts as
well as in the marketing of these athletes' ability and reputation in their sport.
World Sports & Entertainment conducted its business affairs through and as
part of Norby Walters Associates by using the resources of Norby Walters Asso-
ciates, including its bank account, wire transfer account, offices, telephones and
employees.
Indictment at 1.
136. Id. at 6-7.
137. Id. at 7.
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tertainment, Walters and Bloom offered the athletes cash and gra-
tuities such as concert tickets and limousine rides.138
To protect their student-athletes' NCAA eligibility, Walters
and Bloom concealed the fact that the players had signed with an
agent and had accepted money for doing so."' s One deceptive mea-
sure involved post-dating the representation agreement to make it
appear that the contract was signed after the student's last sea-
son. 1' 0 To cover the periodic cash payments students would re-
ceive, Walters and Bloom sent the payments by money orders pay-
able to third parties.14 ' Walters and Bloom paid all signing bonuses
in cash." 2
Walters and Bloom would assure the players that, through
joint efforts of concealment, no one would find out that the ath-
letes had actually forfeited their eligibility to compete in intercol-
legiate athletics."3 However, if a student-athlete decided he or she
no longer wanted to be represented by World Sports & Entertain-
ment, or if a student-athlete refused to renew the World Sports
contract, Walters and Bloom responded with threats.14  Walters
and Bloom would threaten to expose the athlete's representation
agreement with World Sports and Entertainment. "5 Additionally,
recalcitrant athletes were threatened with physical harm to them-
selves and their families. 14 6 The same threats occurred if Walters
and Bloom had trouble collecting any money the student-athletes
owed them.""
138. Id.
139. Id. at 7.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 8.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 9.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Student-athlete Maurice Douglas attempted to retain a new agent and terminate
his representation agreement with World Sports & Entertainment prior to the 1986 Na-
tional Football League draft. Indictment at 44. Walters and Bloom responded by threaten-
ing to "have somebody 'break his legs' so Douglas would not be able to make it to the
upcoming draft." Id. Douglas decided to terminate the representation agreement anyway.
Bloom and Douglas then demanded the return of all the money Douglas had been advanced.
Walters and Bloom "threaten[ed] to send someone to 'get' Douglas if the money was not
repaid immediately." Id.
When student-athlete Ronald Morris refused to sign a second representation agreement
with World Sports & Entertainment, Walters and Bloom demanded the return of money
Morris had been advanced. Indictment at 45. Lloyd Bloom told Morris that the advanced
money didn't belong to Bloom or Walters, but to "people in Los Angeles who 'don't play
around' and who 'don't care what they do to you or your family.'" Id. Walters and Bloom
implied that these "people" would attempt to blow up Morris' new agent's house. Id. They
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The indictment also charged Walters and Bloom with de-
frauding Temple University's Paul Palmer of the $145,000 he re-
ceived as a signing bonus from the National Football League.148
According to the indictment, Lloyd Bloom invested Palmer's
money in a phony "credit repair" business.14 9 The grand jury
found that at least half of Palmer's money went to buying Bloom a
Rolls-Royce convertible."'0
Walters and Bloom were convicted of multiple acts of extor-
tion and attempted extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, for
threatening the student-athletes who attempted to get out of their
representation contracts.""
In April 1989, Bloom and Walters were found guilty on five of
the seven counts charged in the indictment.15 2 On September 17,
1990, the Seventh Circuit reversed their convictions.153 Walters
and Bloom based their appeals on the fact that they sought advice
of counsel before beginning their enterprise, and were told their
proposed actions were not illegal.15 4
At trial, Walters advanced a "good faith reliance of counsel"
defense. Walters claimed that because he was advised that his ac-
tions were not illegal, he could not have acted with the requisite
also threatened to expose Morris' relationship with World Sports & Entertainment, which
would mean the NCAA's "death penalty"-prohibiting his school from playing intercollegi-
ate football entirely for two years. Id. at 46.
In 1986, Everett Gay allegedly considered retaining a different agent. Id. at 46. Walters
and Bloom, hearing that Everett was considering leaving World Sports & Entertainment's
representation, told Gay that Walters and Bloom sent "some people" to the parent of an-
other football player who had left them after signing a representation agreement. Id. at 47.
Bloom told Gay: "That's why we have partners in California to make sure we don't get
messed over." Id.
In 1986, Pittsburgh's Anthony Woods considered leaving World Sports & Entertain-
ment's representation. Id. at 48. Walter and Bloom responded by threatening Woods'
brother and teammate. Id. As Walters told Woods:
This is my life on the line . . . now it's your life on the line. To me I say you
have to examine it because it is your life, your reputation, your business ...
your family, your brother, your school, everything is going to be tainted and
tainted bad. It's gonna be trouble for you.
Id. at 49.
148. Id. at 49-52.
149. Id.
150. Id at 51.
151. United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388, 390-91 (7th Cir. 1990).
152. Id. at 390. Bloom and Walters were found not guilty of mail fraud against Michi-
gan State University and the University of Iowa. Id. at 391. United States District Judge
George Marovich sentenced Walters to five years in prison and Bloom to three years. The
judge also ordered each to serve five years of probation after leaving prison. Id.
153. United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'g 704 F. Supp. 844
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
154. Id. at 391.
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intent required for conviction.'" Walters' trial attorney requested
a jury charge based upon Walters' reliance on counsel; the trial
judge refused. 15" In reversing, the Seventh Circuit held that such a
charge should have been given, and that, if re-tried, Walters' jury
must be given an instruction addressing Walter's "good faith reli-
ance on counsel" defense. 15
Bloom's appeal centered on the fact that Walters' defense vio-
lated Bloom's individual attorney-client privilege with his lawyer,
who had also counseled Walters. 58 Bloom therefore argued that
his trial should have been severed from that of Walters. 59 The
Seventh Circuit agreed.8 0
While the appellate court overturned the convictions of Wal-
ters and Bloom, it never addressed the merits of the government's
case against the two agents. In addition, the court did not address
the question of whether the trial evidence justified the verdict in
the case.
VI. STATE REGULATION
A. Introduction
Twenty-three states have adopted athlete-agent legislation:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 6' Only Tennes-
see, in subjecting NCAA violators to state sanctions, specifically
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 392.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to -41 (1989 & Supp. 1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-48-
101 to -201 (Supp 1989); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. §§
240.5337, 468.452-.457 (1989); 1988 Ga. Laws §§ 43-4A-1 to -18 (effective April 3, 1989); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29-1(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-4-1-4
(West Supp. 1990); IowA CODE § 9A (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.010 to -080 (Bald-
win 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:422A(1).-:422A(2) (West Supp. 1991); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 56, § 632(0 (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411e(1)(a) (West 1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325 E.33(3) (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 73-41-1 to -23 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 388.085 (Michie 1990); 1990 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 78C-71 to 78C-80; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4771.01 to .99 (Anderson Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 821.61-.71
(West 1989); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 7107(e) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 59-102-10 to -40 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-2101 to -2109 (1989); TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, §§ 1-11 (Vernon Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-518.A to -524
(1990).
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incorporated the NCAA's regulations. 11 2 The remaining states es-
tablished their own restrictions, which has resulted in a lack of
uniformity in the regulation of athlete-agents. For example, while
most state regulations require athlete-agents to register with the
individual state, Indiana and Illinois have no such requirement.'63
Moreover, each state places different restrictions on activities
agents can perform while their target athletes remain eligible for
intercollegiate competition. Most states, for instance, prohibit
agents from entering into a representation contract with intercolle-
giate athletes while the athletes are eligible to participate in inter-
collegiate sports. Ohio, however, allows agents to sign a collegiate
athlete at any time, provided that the contract is both written and
submitted to the athlete's school for inspection.' 6 '
Lack of uniformity also exists concerning regulation of the
scope of agent activities. Agent activities normally range well be-
yond representing an athlete in professional contract negotiations;
agent and management activities can also encompass investment
management, tax and estate planning, and long-range career plan-
ning.' 6 Enormous potential exists for experienced businessmen to
embezzle funds from a young, financially unsophisticated athlete,
or for inexperienced businessmen to simply mismanage funds.
B. Analysis
Little regulation of the activities of sports agents in the field
of intercollegiate athletics exists. At one time, the NCAA did pro-
vide an annual registration program for sports agents. Each partic-
ipating agent was required to: (1) give the NCAA the agent's pro-
fessional and educational background; (2) notify a school's athletic
director before contacting an enrolled student-athlete with remain-
ing eligibility; and (3) refrain from any activity which would jeop-
ardize a student-athlete's NCAA eligibility.' 6 The program, how-
ever, was strictly voluntary. It was discontinued because some
registered agents told student-athletes that the NCAA endorsed
162. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2103 (1989).
163. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29-1(e) (Smith-Hurd 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§
35-46-4-1 to -4 (West 1989).
164. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4771.02 (Anderson Supp. 1989).
165. For an overview of the potential duties assumed by agents and managers, see
generally Remick & Eisen, The Personal Manager in the Entertainment and Sports Indus-
tries, 3 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. (1986).
166. Telephone interview with Richard Hilliard, Director of Enforcement for the
NCAA (July 2, 1991).
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them.16 7
California,'68 Oklahoma, 69 Louisiana,1 70 Texas, 17  and Ala-
bama 7 require prospective agents to be licensed by the state labor
commissioner. 7 3 To obtain a license in California, for example, an
applicant must meet the following requirements: (1) provide infor-
mation concerning the applicant's training and experience in con-
tract negotiation, contract dispute resolution, and arbitration;' 7 4
(2) post a bond of $25,000 with the labor commissioner; (3) file a
fee schedule;' (4) allow inspection of the applicant's records; 177
and (5) avoid conflict of interest.17 8
California's law prohibits collecting fees which amount to
more than ten percent of an athlete's earnings over any calendar
year. 7 9 Contracts not negotiated by a registered agent are void and
unenforceable. s Violation of the law is a misdemeanor, punisha-
ble by a fine of not less than $1000 or imprisonment of not more
than ninety days, or both.' 81
Athletic agents in Oklahoma must register with the Oklahoma
Secretary of State in order to contract NCAA athletes.'82 To regis-
ter, agents must provide information concerning their back-
ground' and pay an annual fee of $1000 to the state.' 8' Oklahoma
law also requires that agents: (1) avoid conflicts of interest; 8 5 (2)
not solicit applicants;8 6 (3) file copies of the fee schedules; and (4)
put a $100,000 bond or proof of the equivalent amount in malprac-
167. Address by Richard Perko, NCAA Legislative Services, in Madison, Wisconsin
(August 11, 1990). The sole sanction for a violation was removal of the agent's name from
the registration list. Id.
168. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West Supp. 1989).
169. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 821.61-.71 (West 1989).
170. 1987 La. Acts 925 §§ 421-430.
171. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, §§ 1-13 (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1991).
172. ALA. CODE § 8-26-4 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
173. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1513 (West Supp. 1989).
174. Id. at § 1511(d).
175. Id. at § 1519.
176. Id. at § 1531(a).
177. Id. at § 1533.
178. Id. at §§ 1535.5 -.7.
179. Id. at § 1531(b).
180. Id. at § 1546.
181. Id. at § 1547.
182. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.61C (West 1989).
183. Id.
184. Id. at § 821.62E.
185. Id. at § 821.64.5.
186. Id. at §§ 821.64.6-.7. An agent may not offer anything of value to an employee of
an institution or to athletes. Id.
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tice insurance.18 7 Agents cannot offer anything of mutual value to
induce a college player to sign a representation agreement.188 Fees
may not exceed ten percent of an athlete's earnings over the course
of a twelve-month period.18 9 Any agent contract negotiated by an
athlete-agent who has failed to comply with this act is void.190 Vio-
lations of the Oklahoma laws are subject to civil and criminal
penalties. 191
In Louisiana, athlete-agents must register annually with the
Louisiana Secretary of State and pay an annual fee of $100.192 Lou-
isiana law allows registered agents to contact athletes, but only af-
ter the completion of the athlete's last intercollegiate contest.'93 An
attorney in Louisiana is permitted to act as an agent in his practice
of law and hence is not required to register with the Secretary of
State or pay the annual fee.194 A Louisiana attorney practicing as
an agent is subject to the same penalties as a registered athletic
agent.' 96
Texas requires athlete-agents to register and post a bond.'96
Agents may not contact athletes until the athlete's collegiate career
has ended, but an agent can send the player materials relating to
his or her credentials or services offered. 9 7 Athletes are allowed to
contact agents to determine the agent's ability to provide financial
and material services to the athlete. 9 8
The remainder of this section will discuss and analyze each of
the twenty-three state's regulations, in order to provide a compari-
son and contrast of the current status of athlete-agent legislation.
1. Alabama
The Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act of 1987 estab-
lished a commission to regulate athlete-agents.'99 The commission
sets forth rules of conduct governing Alabama athlete-agents, hears
disputes and controversies, and evaluates applicants for registra-
187. Id. at § 821.62G.
188. Id. at §§ 821.64.6-.7.
189. Id. at § 821.63D.
190. Id. at § 821.66B.
191. Id. at §§ 821.66.A1, .A2, & .A4.
192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:422E (West Supp. 1991).
193. Id. at § 4:424(8).
194. Id. at §§ 4:430-430B.
195. Id. at § 4:430E.
196. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
197. Id. at § 6(c).
198. Id.
199. ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1-41 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
1991]
27
McKenna and DiGiuseppe: Policing Sports Agents: The First Four Years
Published by Institutional Repository, 1991
28 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
tion of athlete-agents.200 Alabama requires the registration of all
athlete-agents,20 1 and in evaluating applications, the commission
considers the "education, training, experience, and character of the
applicant."20 2
By a majority vote, the commission may reject an applicant
for making a false representation on his or her application, misap-
propriating funds, violating a fiduciary duty, or engaging in con-
duct which violates or causes a student-athlete to violate any rule
or regulation promulgated by the NCAA governing student-ath-
letes and their relationship with athlete-agents. 03 Thus, the Ala-
bama Act attempts to enforce, on its own, the NCAA's regulations.
Applicants whose registrations are rejected or revoked are given a
hearing.20 4
The Alabama Act defines an athlete-agent as anyone who "re-
cruits or solicits any athlete to enter into any agent contract or
professional sports services contract, or, for a fee, procures, offers,
promises, or attempts to obtain employment for any athlete with a
professional sports team." 205 Under the Act, attorneys are consid-
ered athlete-agents when advising or conducting contract negotia-
tions for their athlete clients.2 °0
While asset management is not included in the definition of an
athlete-agent's activities, those agents who receive an athlete's sal-
ary for management fees must deposit the funds into a trust fund
established for the athlete.20 7 In addition, agents must reveal any
ownership interest they may have in entities recommended by the
agent and used by the athlete for investment decisions.0 8 Athlete-
agents must file a fee schedule with the commission, outlining the
fees for services the agent intends to charge.2 09 Under the Alabama
statute, no agent may collect in one year more than ten percent of
an athlete's total yearly compensation.1 0
To ensure that the commission can regulate agency records,
agents are required to keep records mandated by the commission
200. Id. at §§ 8-26-3, -5(5), -38.
201. Id. at § 8-26-4.
202. Id. at § 8-26-6.
203. Id. at § 8-26-7(a).
204. Id. at § 8-26-7(b). This includes the right of cross-examination. Id.
205. Id. at § 8-26-2(3).
206. Id.
207. Id. at § 8-26-25.
208. Id. at § 8-26-31.
209. Id. at § 8-26-24(a).
210. Id, at § 8-26-24(b).
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concerning the agent's contractual relationship with the athlete.2"
The records must include the fees received from each athlete, as
well as a copy of the contract signed with each athlete.2 12 All
agency contracts must conform with the commission's require-
ments.2 13 While Alabama does not require that contracts be sub-
mitted to the commission for approval, the contract itself must
state that the athlete jeopardizes his or her amateur status by en-
tering into the contract.2
14
The agent must either deposit a surety bond of at least
$50,000 with-the commission or maintain malpractice insurance
worth at least the same amount.21 5 Violation of the Alabama Act
subjects the agent to possible forfeiture of this bond,216 and may
also result in a fine of not more than $5,000, or imprisonment of at
least one year but not more than ten years, or both.21 7
2. Arkansas
Arkansas defines an athlete-agent as someone who, "for com-
pensation, directly or indirectly recruits or solicits an athlete to
enter into an agent contract or professional sport services contract
with that person or that for a fee procures offers, promises, or at-
tempts to obtain employment for an athlete with a professional
sports team.121 8 Arkansas law, however, does not include any "em-
ployee(s) or other representatives of professional sports team(s),"
or any licensed members of the Arkansas Bar, in its definition of
athlete-agent.21 9
Athlete-agents must register with the Arkansas Secretary of
State before contacting any athlete, either directly or indirectly.220
Applicants for registration must provide the Secretary with infor-
mation concerning the agent's formal background and training.2 1
Additionally, the agent must list all financially-interested parties
in the agent's business. 2 2 To receive a certificate of registration,
211. Id. at § 8-26-26.
212. Id. at §§ 8-26-26(2)-(3).
213. Id. at § 8-26-22.
214. Id. at § 8-26-23.
215. Id. at § 8-26-14.
216. Id. at § 8-26-15.
217. Id. at § 8-26-41.
218. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 17-48-101(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1989).
219. Id. at § 17-48-101(a)(2)(B).
220. Id. at § 17-48-201(a).
221. Id. at § 17-48-201(b)(3).
222. Id. at § 17-48-201(b)(3)(E).
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athlete-agents must post a $100,000 surety bond.2 2
Any representation contracts negotiated by athlete-agents who
violate Arkansas regulations are void.2 24 Agents who violate the Ar-
kansas statute face forfeiture of any consideration paid to the ath-
lete-agent on the athlete's behalf,225 and any right of repayment for
anything of value the agent may have given the athlete to induce
the athlete to sign with the agent.22
3. California
California's Athlete Agencies Act (Act), passed in 1981, repre-
sented the first state governmental attempt to regulate sports
agents. Under the Act, "no person shall engage in or carry on the
occupation as an athlete-agent without first registering with the
Labor Commissioner. ' '2   The Act defines an agent's activities as
the solicitation of an athlete for purposes of professional represen-
tation, negotiation of a professional representation contract for an
athlete, or any attempt to procure employment for an athlete.229
Upon receipt of an application for registration, the California
Labor Commissioner may evaluate an applicant by investigating
the applicant's respective education, training, professional experi-
ence and personal character.3 ° If approved, registration lasts one
year and the agent must re-apply annually.2 31
The Act requires that all contracts between the athlete and his
or her agent be written on a form approved by the Labor Commis-
232sioner. Approved forms must inform athletes that, although the
agent is registered with the State Labor Commissioner, such regis-
tration does not imply approval by the Labor Commissioner of the
terms and conditions of the particular athlete-agent contract in
question or the competence of the athlete-agent.2 33 The contract
must also state that the athlete may jeopardize his or her amateur
standing by entering into a representation contract.23 4
223. Id. at § 17-48-202(a).
224. Id. at § 17-48-102(b).
225. Id. at § 17-48-102(a)(2).
226. Id. at § 17-48-102(a)(1).
227. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West Supp. 1989).
228. Id. at § 1510.
229. Id. at § 1500(b). Representation contracts entered into with unregistered agents
render the contracts void. Id. at § 1546.
230. Id. at §§ 1512, 1513.
231. Id. at § 1515.
232. Id. at § 1530.
233. Id.
234. Id. at § 1530.5.
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Under the Act, no agent may receive directly or indirectly
more than ten percent of an athlete's yearly gross earnings.2 5 Each
representation contract must contain a fee schedule delineating the
amounts the agent intends to charge for professional services.2 36
Licensed agents must also post a $25,000 surety bond with the La-
bor Commissioner prior to the issuance or renewal of a registration
to insure against potential misconduct or misrepresentation by the
athlete's agent.2 37
Agents who violate the California regulations face license revo-
cation or suspension.2 38 In addition, agents may face criminal sanc-
tions including fines of not less than $1000, or imprisonment for a
period of not more than ninety days, or both.23 9
While the Act grants the State Labor Commission broad dis-
cretion over the licensing of agents and threatens recalcitrant
agents with criminal penalties, it contains several loopholes. Mem-
bers of the State Bar of California, for example, are exempt from
the Act's regulations when attorneys act as "legal counsel" for rep-
resented athletes, even when these attorneys also serve as
agents.2 0 Under the Act, an agent-attorney negotiating a contract
for an athlete-client would fall outside the scope of the Act's regu-
lations. The Act's definition of "agent" represents another weak-
ness-investment counseling and money management do not fall
within the Act's definition of agent activities.2 1
4. Florida
Florida defines an athlete-agent as one who directly or indi-
rectly recruits or solicits a student-athlete to enter into an agent
contract, or who, for a fee, procures offers, promises, or attempts to
obtain employment for a student-athlete with a professional sports
team or as a professional athlete.24 Athletes must register with the
Florida Department of Professional Regulation every two years. 3
In Florida, athlete-agents may not publish or provide any false
235. Id. at § 1531(b).
236. Id. at § 1531(c). The contract must also describe the type of services to be per-
formed for these fees. Id.
237. Id. at § 1519.
238. Id. at § 1527.
239. Id. at § 1547.
240. Id. at § 1500(b).
241. Id.
242. FLA. STAT. §§ 240.5337(1)(b), 468.452(1) (1989).
243. Id. at § 468.453(1).
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or misleading information, " ' nor offer anything of value to induce
a student-athlete to enter into an agreement by which the agent
will represent the student-athlete.2 4 5 Agents are also prohibited
from offering anything of value, or agreeing to offer anything of
value, to any employee of a college or university located in the
state in return for referrals of student-athletes. 246 Florida, however,
does not consider negotiations concerning an agent's fee an
"inducement. 24 7
Florida regulations do not prohibit contacting or even signing
a student-athlete before the athlete's last intercollegiate contest., 8
Nevertheless, contracts between an agent and a student-athlete
must warn the student that signing the contract might jeopardize
the student's eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics.2 4'9
In addition, contracts between agents and student-athletes require
that the athlete notify the athletic director or president of the ath-
lete's school of the signing of the contract before the student be-
gins practicing for or participating in any intercollegiate athletic
event, or within seventy-two hours after entering into the con-
tract.250 Florida student-athletes retain the right to rescind their
representation contracts within ten days following the signing of
the contract or notification to their school. 251 The athlete, however,
must repay the agent anything paid to the agent, exclusive of
travel, meals, lodging, or entertainment expenses if the athlete
chooses to rescind the contract.2 52 Student-athletes may not waive
their right to rescind under any circumstances, 53 or postdate agent
contracts. 54
Under Florida law, sports agents and student-athletes may be
held liable to the student's school for damages resulting from stu-
dent ineligibility following the signing of a contract with an
agent.25 5 An agent or student may also be assessed treble damages
equal to three times the value of the athlete's scholarship fur-
nished by the school to the student during the student's period of
244. Id. at § 468.456(1).
245. Id. at § 468.456(4).
246. Id. at § 468.456(3).
247. Id.
248. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 240.5337, 468.452-.457 (1989).
249. Id. at §§ 240.5337(8), 468.454(4) (1989).
250. Id.
251. Id. at §§ 240.5337(8), 468.454(7).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at §§ 240.5337(9), 468.454(8).
255. Id. at §§ 240.5337(7), 468.454(6).
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eligibility. 5 6 Moreover, the Florida Department of Professional
Regulation may revoke the registration of any athlete-agent for
failure to comply with the state's regulations.257
5. Georgia
The Georgia Athlete Agents Regulatory Act of 1988258 (Geor-
gia Act) established the Georgia Athlete Agent Regulatory Com-
mission. This Commission, whose members are appointed by the
state governor and legislature, 59 reviews applications for athlete-
agent registrations260 and promulgates rules and standards of con-
duct for athlete-agents.261
The Georgia Act defines athlete-agent as a person who directly
or indirectly recruits or solicits an athlete to enter into an agent
contract or professional sports services contract, or attempts to ob-
tain employment for an athlete with a professional sports team.26 2
All athlete-agents must register with the Athlete Agent Regulatory
Commission.213 Registration applicants must provide the Commis-
sion with evidence of experience either in the fields of contracts,
contract negotiation, complaint resolution, arbitration, or civil res-
olution of contract disputes.264
In its evaluation, the Commission may consider relevant train-
ing, experience, or education in any of the above-mentioned
fields.26 Additionally, the Commission may, by a majority vote, re-
fuse or revoke a registration on the basis of false representation,
misappropriation of funds, prior convictions, violation of any
NCAA rule, or engagement in any act resulting in an athlete's loss
of intercollegiate eligibility."66 If granted, registration is valid for
up to two years. 26 7 All registered athlete-agents must post a surety
bond with the Commission of at least $10,000.268 The bond must
be commissioned to pay damages to any athletic department af-
256. Id.
257. Id. at § 468.455.
258. 1988 Ga. Laws §§ 43-4A-2 to -19.
259. Id. at § 43-4A-3(a).
260. Id. at § 43-4A-5(a).
261. Id. at § 43-4A-16(a).
262. Id. at § 43-4A-2(3).
263. Id. at § 43-4A-4(a).
264. Id. at § 43-4A-5(b).
265. Id.
266. Id. at § 43-4A-7(a).
267. Id. at § 43-4A-9.
268. Id. at § 43-4A-13.
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fected by the agent's actions.2 9
Under the Georgia Act, athlete-agents who intend to sign col-
lege athletes to a representation contract must notify the Commis-
sion of this intended action at least thirty days before the signing
of the actual contract.7 0 The Commission, in turn, confidentially
notifies the athletic director of the athlete's school.271
The Georgia Act prohibits agents from compensating or other-
wise jeopardizing any athlete eligible to participate in intercollegi-
ate athletics. 272 Athlete-agents who violate the Georgia Act are
subject to forfeiture of the surety bond, voiding of an agent's rep-
resentation contract with an athlete, and forfeiture of any compen-
sation given to an athlete to enter into a representation contract.2 7
6. Illinois
Under Illinois law, any person who gives any money, goods, or
other items of value to an individual enrolled in an institution of
higher education who participates in interscholastic competition,
and represents or attempts to represent this individual in future
negotiations for employment with any professional sports team,
commits a misdemeanor. 274 Thus, Illinois flatly prohibits monetary
inducement to enter into a representation agreement, or any repre-
sentation of an athlete still enrolled in school.
7. Indiana
In Indiana, anyone who intends to enter into either a repre-
sentation contract or a sports services contract with any athlete
eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics must provide writ-
ten notification, no later than ten days prior to executing the con-
tract, to the Athletic Director of the athlete's school.2 7 5 Presuma-
bly, this means both the athlete's agent and the professional sports
team with which the athlete signed a contract could be held ac-
countable for failure to notify.
Notification must include the following: (1) the name and bus-
iness address of each party to the relevant contract; (2) whether
the contract represents a representation agreement or a profes-
269. Id.
270. Id. at § 43-4A-16(a)(1).
271. Id.
272. Id. at§ 43-4A-16(b).
273. Id. at §§ 43-4A-16(c)-(e).
274. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29-1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
275. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-4-4 (West Supp. 1990).
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sional services contract; and (3) the date that the relevant contract
will be executed.2 76 The agent and/or professional team that fails
to notify the athlete's Athletic Director commits a felony under
Indiana law. 2"
8. Iowa
Iowa defines athlete-agent more broadly than other states.278
Iowa's regulations provide that athlete-agents are those who solicit
a student-athlete to enter into a representation contract, or who
attempt to obtain employment for a student-athlete with a profes-
sional sports team.2 7 9 Iowa, however, also defines an athlete-agent
as anyone who represents a student-athlete for compensation. 280
Notwithstanding this broad definition, Iowa excepts state-licensed
attorneys from its definition of athlete-agent.281
All athlete-agents in Iowa must register with the Iowa Secre-
tary of State.282 Registration in Iowa lasts for one year.2 83 To re-
ceive a registration certificate, agents must submit information
concerning their background, including education and training his-
tory.284 Agents must also submit information concerning any crimi-
nal record they might have.2 85 In addition, agents must disclose to
the Iowa Secretary of State any sanctions or disciplinary actions
assessed against the agent by any educational institution.2 86
Moreover, athlete-agents must provide the Iowa Secretary of
State with the names and addresses of all persons "financially in-
terested" in the agent's business, including partners and associ-
ates.28 7 All athlete-agents registered in Iowa must post a bond of at
least $25,000 with the Secretary of State. Non-resident agents
must consent to Iowa service of process.2 8
Iowa athlete-agents are specifically forbidden from entering
into a representation agreement with any student-athlete, or giving
anything of value to a student-athlete, until the completion of the
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See IowA CODE § 9A.2 (1989).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at § 9A.3(1).
283. Id. at § 9A.3(2).
284. Id. at § 9A.3(1)(c).
285. Id. at § 9A.3(1)(e).
286. Id. at § 9A.3(1)(g).
287. Id. at § 9A.3(1)(d).
288. Id.
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student's last intercollegiate contest, including post-season
games.289 Iowa athlete-agents are prohibited from postdating any
agreements signed before the athlete's last game..29 The Iowa stat-
utes proscribe agents from offering athletes anything of value to
induce an athlete to enter into a representation agreement with the
agent.291
Iowa law permits athlete-agents to interview college athletes
during the athlete's senior year if the athlete's school permits the
agent to conduct on-campus interviewing during the school year.292
In return, the agent must abide by the rules of the school allowing
the interviews.293
All agent contracts entered into with student-athletes must
follow the state-approved form.294 Approved contracts must in-
clude, in bold print, that registration with the Iowa Secretary of
State does not imply approval of the agent or endorsement of the
contract.298 Moreover, approved contracts must declare that, by
entering into the contract, the athlete may jeopardize his or her
standing to participate in intercollegiate athletics.29 Approved
contracts must also inform the student that he or she may termi-
nate the contract within five days of its signing. 97 Under an ap-
proved contract, agent compensation must follow Iowa's estab-
lished fee schedule.298
Agents who violate Iowa's regulations are subject to a civil
penalty of $10,000.299 A violation of Iowa's regulation is also con-
sidered a misdemeanor.300 The Secretary of State may deny or re-
voke certification to anyone who violates the regulations.301 In ad-
dition, the state may also deny or revoke certification to any agent
who falsifies his or her application form, or who breaches his or her
fiduciary duty to his or her client.302
289. Id. at § 9A.8(3).
290. Id. at § 9A.8(4).
291. Id. at § 9A.8(2).
292. Id. at § 9A.9.
293. Id.
294. Id. at § 9A.7(1).
295. Id. at § 9A.7(2).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at § 9A.7(3).
299. Id. at § 9A.11(2).
300. Id. at § 9A.11(3).
301. Id. at § 9A.5(4).
302. Id. at § 9A.5(2)(3).
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9. Kentucky
The Kentucky Penal Code classifies Unauthorized Sports
Agency" as a felony 803 "Unauthorized Sports Agency" is defined as
directly or indirectly recruiting or soliciting a student-athlete to
enter into an agent contract, or procuring, offering, promising or
attempting to obtain employment for a student-athlete with a pro-
fessional sports team or as a professional athlete before the stu-
dent-athlete's eligibility for collegiate athletics expires.304
10. Louisiana
In Louisiana, an agent must register with the Louisiana Secre-
tary of State prior to contacting any Louisiana NCAA athlete or
non-NCAA athlete who has never signed a professional sports con-
tract.0 5 Louisiana defines an athlete-agent as one who directly or
indirectly recruits or solicits an athlete to enter into an agent con-
tract or professional sports services contract with that person, or
who, for a fee, procures, offers, promises, or attempts to obtain em-
ployment for an athlete with a professional sports team .30 Regis-
tration applicants must provide the Secretary of State with infor-
mation concerning his or her professional background. 7 No
guidelines for applicant acceptance are given, but the Secretary
may revoke any agent's license for violation of Louisiana law pur-
suant to an adjudicatory hearing.30 8
Under the Louisiana statute, agents must submit a list of pro-
posed fees they intend to charge for their services. 0 9 In addition,
athlete-agents must, for at least five years, keep records outlining
travel and entertainment expenses incurred by the athlete-agent. 310
These records must include the nature, dollar amount, purpose,
date and place of the expenditure, as well as the person on whose
behalf the expenditures were made."
Louisiana prohibits athlete-agents from entering into any
agreement with an NCAA athlete until the completion of the ath-
lete's last intercollegiate sports contest.312 Moreover, agents may
303. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.010 to -.080 (Baldwin 1989).
304. Id. at § 518.080.
305. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:422.A(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1991).
306. Id. at § 4:421.A(2).
307. Id. at §§ 4:422.C(1)-(4).
308. Id. at § 4:422.F.
309. Id. at § 4:423.C.
310. Id. at § 4:427B.
311. Id. at §§ 4:427A(1)-4:427A(5).
312. Id. at § 4:424(8).
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not make any false statements to any Louisiana NCAA or non-
NCAA athlete.3 13 Curiously, Louisiana law forbids agents from of-
fering anything of value to non-NCAA athletes to induce them to
enter into a representation agreement, but remains silent on induc-
ing NCAA athletes using similar means. 14
Civil penalties for violation of the Louisiana statutes include
the refund of any fees paid by the athlete to his or her agent, 13 as
well as forfeiture of anything of value paid to an NCAA athlete to
induce the athlete to enter into a representation contract.3 16 Crimi-
nal penalties include a $10,000 fine or imprisonment for up to one
year. 3 17
11. Maryland
Maryland's regulations classify a sports agent as anyone who
"recruits or solicits an athlete to enter into an agent contract or
financial services contract with that person for a fee, or attempts to
obtain employment for an athlete with a professional sports team
for a fee."'318 Thus, Maryland's regulations encompass asset man-
agement as an agent activity. In addition, Maryland attorneys are
subject to athlete-agent registration. 9
Sports agents in Maryland must apply for registration and a
license with the Secretary of State.32 0 Applicants must provide the
Secretary with a description of their formal training, practical ex-
perience, educational background, and the names and addresses of
all persons who hold a financial interest in their business.32 Mary-
land's regulations do not state what the Secretary may take into
consideration in approving an application. Registrations are valid
for a period of one year.322 The Secretary may, after a hearing, sus-
pend or revoke any license granted under these provisions.2 3
Agents must also file a fee schedule with the Secretary of
State, delineating the fees the agent collects for its services.2  No
agent may collect, during a twelve-month period, more than the
313. Id. at § 4:424(4).
314. Id. at § 4:424(7).
315. Id. at § 4:426A(2).
316. Id. at § 4:426A(1).
317. Id. at § 4:426(C)(5).
318. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 632(f) (1989).
319. Id. at § 633(b)(ii).
320. Id. at § 633(a).
321. Id. at §§ 633(b)(3)-(4).
322. Id. at § 633(d).
323. Id. at § 634.
324. Id. at § 635(a).
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amount earned by the agent's athlete in that period . 25 Agents are
required to maintain records concerning travel and entertainment
expenditures, and expenses incurred in servicing the agent's
athlete."2 6
Maryland's regulations prohibit false representation, paid re-
ferrals from any school employees, and the offering of "anything of
value" to induce athletes to sign a representation contract with the
agent.3 17 Additionally, prior to a student-athlete's last school con-
test, agents are restricted in their communications with the stu-
dent athlete from inducing the athlete into entering a representa-
tion agreement.32 ' The agent, however, may contact student
athletes by sending them his or her professional credentials, and
materials describing the specific services provided by that agent.3 29
Sanctions for violating Maryland's regulations include the re-
fund of any payments made to the agent on the athlete's behalf for
the athlete's representation services, and forfeiture of any funds
paid to the athlete to induce the athlete to sign a representation
agreement.330 Criminal penalties consist of a fine not exceeding
$10,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.3 '
12. Michigan
Michigan prohibits athlete-agents from inducing student- ath-
letes into entering into a representation contract while the athlete
is eligible to compete in intercollegiate athletics.3 32 Michigan also
proscribes the giving or offering of anything of value to school em-
ployees, in exchange for referrals of student-athletes to the
agent.13
Michigan designates athlete-agents as those who attempt to
obtain employment for student-athletes or attempt to recruit stu-
dent-athletes to enter a professional agent services contract or an
agent contract.3 4 The statute exempts members of an athlete's im-
mediate family from its definition of athlete-agent.3 5 Athlete-
325. Id. at § 635(b).
326. Id. at § 638.
327. Id. at §§ 636(a)(1)-(4).
328. Id. at § 636(a)(5).
329. Id. at § 636(c).
330. Id. at § 637.
331. Id. at § 639.
332. MICH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 750.411e(1)(a) (West 1990).
333. Id. at § 750.411e(1)(b).
334. Id. at § 750.411e(3)(b).
335. Id. at § 750.411e(3)(b). The statutory definition of immediate family is spouse,
child, parent, step-parent, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sister, parent-in-law, brother-
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agents who violate the Michigan statute are guilty of a
misdemeanor. 6
13. Minnesota
In Minnesota, agents may neither help student-athletes enter
into a professional sports contract nor represent a student-athlete
before the student signs a waiver of intercollegiate athletic eligibil-
ity."37 Contracts entered into without the waiver are voidable at
the student-athlete's option.33 8 If the contract is voided, the agent
must return to the student-athlete any compensation received
under the student-athlete contract.
3 39
Additionally, under the Minnesota statute, agents may not
give, offer, or promise to give anything to an employee of an educa-
tional institution in exchange for either referrals of student-ath-
letes, or for influencing a student-athlete towards entering into ei-
ther a representation contract with an agent or any professional
sports contract.3
40
14. Mississippi
Mississippi enacted its regulatory legislation in 1988.341 Under
the Mississippi statute, athlete-agents must register with the Mis-
sissippi Secretary of State before making any contact with an
NCAA athlete.3 42 The Secretary may refuse to register an appli-
cant on the basis of false or misleading statements on the appli-
cant's registration application, previous conviction for fraud, em-
bezzlement, theft, or misappropriation of funds. 343 In addition, an
applicant may be rejected for having violated the NCAA Code.3 44
The Mississippi statute prohibits agents from giving "anything
of value" to a Mississippi NCAA athlete to induce the athlete to
in-law, sister-in-law, nephew, niece, aunt, uncle, first cousin, or the spouse or guardian of
any of the aforementioned relatives. Id. at § 750.411e(3)(c).
336. Id. at § 750.411e(2). The statutory violation is punishable by a fine of not more
than $50,000, or an amount equal to three times the value of the amount given, offered, or
promised to induce the signing of a representation agreement, or the amount paid to a
school employee for a student referral, or imprisonment for up to one year, or both. Id.
337. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33(3) (West 1990).
338. Id. at § 325E.33(5).
339. Id.
340. Id. at § 325E.33(4).
341. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-41-1 to -23 (1989).
342. Id. at § 73-41-3.
343. Id. at § 73-41-7(1)(a)(b).
344. Id. at § 73-41-7(1)(c).
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sign a representation contract.4 5 In addition, the statute forbids
the sale or transfer of an interest in an athlete without prior writ-
ten disclosure to the state," the intentional declaration of any
false representation or promise to any athlete,347 and the payment
to any college employee for referrals. 4 s The statute also attempts
to protect athletes from financial mismanagement by requiring any
agent who signs a financial services contract with an athlete to post
a $100,000 surety bond.3 "4
Criminal sanctions for violating the Mississippi statute include
up to two years imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000, or both.350
Civil penalties consist of a refund of any payments made to the
agent on behalf of the athlete.35 1 However, before an agent's regis-
tration can be suspended or revoked, the agent is entitled to a
hearing before the Secretary of State. 52
The Mississippi statute differs from the regulatory statutes of
California, 53 Oklahoma, 354 and Texas355 in that it does not hold
the agent exclusively responsible for violations. A college that loses
the eligibility of an athlete due to violations of the NCAA rules has
a cause of action against either the agent or the athlete.358
15. Nevada
Nevada's athlete-agent statutes put teeth into the NCAA's
regulations. In Nevada, anyone who causes an institution or a stu-
dent-athlete to violate an NCAA rule becomes liable for dam-
ages. 357 Damages may include lost revenues from television con-
tracts, or prohibition from participating in post-season
tournaments.5 8 Furthermore, institutions bringing successful suits
under this statute are entitled to attorney's fees. 359
345. Id. at § 73-41-11(g).
346. Id. at § 73-41-11(a).
347. Id. at § 73-41-11(d).
348. Id. at § 73-41-11(0.
349. Id. at § 73-41-9(1).
350. Id. at § 73-41-15(e).
351. Id. at § 73-41-15(2)(b).
352. Id. at § 73-41-7(3)(b).
353. See supra notes 227-241 and accompanying text.
354. See infra notes 397-410 and accompanying text.
355. See infra notes 438-449 and accompanying text.
356. Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-23 (1989). The college may sue to recover scholarship
costs, losses of revenue, and other damages suffered by the institution as a result of the
offending athlete's loss of eligibility. Id.
357. NE v. REv. STAT. ANN. § 388.085 (Michie 1990).
358. Id.
359. Id. at § 398.085(4).
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The Nevada statute regulates student-athletes entering into a
contractual relationship with a sports agent for the purpose of pro-
curing employment with a professional sports team, providing
loans or other forms of financial assistance to the student- athlete,
or representing the student-athlete in any matter related to the
student's pursuit of a career in professional sports. 60 Attorneys
acting as legal counsel for an athlete, however, are excepted from
the Nevada regulations. 61
All agent-student contracts must be in writing, signed, nota-
rized, and contain a warning that a student-athlete who signs such
an agreement may lose his or her eligibility to compete in intercol-
legiate athletics. 62 Notice of this agreement must be sent to the
athlete's school.3 63
Student-athletes have twenty days to rescind a representation
agreement if they so choose. 64 If the student rescinds the agree-
ment within the allotted twenty day period, any consideration paid
to the student by the agent to induce the signing of the agreement
is considered a gift, and therefore not recoverable by the prospec-
tive agent.365
Any contract between an agent and a student-athlete which
violates the Nevada regulations is void and unenforceable. 6 In ad-
dition, provisions for criminal sanctions guard against certain ac-
tions by the agent. 67 Under threat of criminal penalty, sports
agents may not make any false promises or representations con-
cerning employment, offer anything of value to employees of edu-
cational institutions in return for the referral of potential clients,
or offer anything of value to anyone to encourage a student-athlete
to enter into a contractual relationship with the agent. 68
16. North Carolina
North Carolina defines athlete-agent as one who, for compen-
sation, solicits an athlete to enter into a representation contract
with the agent, attempts to obtain employment for the athlete with
a professional sports team, or provides financial services for an
360. Id. at § 398.015.
361. Id. at § 398.065.
362. Id. at §§ 398.095(1)(a)-(d).
363. Id. at § 398.095(3).
364. Id. at § 398.095(4).
365. Id. at § 398.095(6).
366. Id. at § 398.095(7).
367. Id. at § 398.065.
368. Id. at § 398.065(1).
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athlete.3 9 The definition, however, excepts state-licensed attorneys
who represent no more than two athletes.7
Athlete-agents must register yearly with the North Carolina
Secretary of State.37 ' Registration applications must include the
agent's educational background and history of formal training, as
well as the applicant's occupation for the five years preceding the
date of the agent's application.3 7 2 Furthermore, the agent must
provide the names and addresses of all parties "financially inter-
ested" in the agent's business, such as partners or associates. 37
Registered agents applying for renewal must also provide the Sec-
retary of State with the names and addresses of all athletes previ-
ously represented by the agent.37 4
North Carolina athlete-agents are required to post an annual
bond of $100,000 with the state.3 7 5 A state-registered athlete-agent
must also keep records of all fees received from his or her clients
and all expenses incurred on behalf of the agent's clients, including
travel and entertainment expenditures.7
Athlete-agents in North Carolina are forbidden from direct
contact with a student-athlete to discuss representation of the ath-
lete or the possibility of future professional sports employment for
the athlete until after completion of the student's last school con-
test, including post-season games.3 77 In addition, an athlete-agent
may not offer "anything of value," (except for "reasonable en-
tertainment and transportation" expenses), to a student-athlete to
persuade him or her to enter into a representation agreement.37 8
Athlete-agents may, however, send students written materials
stating the professional credentials of the agent or the specific ser-
vices the agent offers. 7 9 North Carolina specifically permits a stu-
dent-athlete's parents or legal guardians to contact and interview
an agent to determine the agent's professional proficiency. 380
Agents planning to contact athletes must give the athlete's school
369. 1990 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. § 78C-71.
370. Id. at § 78C-72(K).
371. Id. at § 78C-72(D).
372. Id. at §§ 78C-72(B)(2)-(3).
373. Id. at § 78C-72(B)(5).
374. Id. at § 78C-72(E)(1).
375. Id. at § 78C-72(H).
376. Id. at § 78C-80.
377. Id. at § 78C-76(B)(5).
378. Id. at § 78C-76(B)(3).
379. Id. at § 78C-76(C).
380. Id.
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prior written notice. 8 "
All financial-services contracts entered into by athletes and
agents in North Carolina must disclose the fees and percentages
the athlete is paying the agent under the contract.38 2 In addition,
the contract must not only state that the athlete may cancel the
agreement within sixteen days of its signing, 8 but also that regis-
tration of an agent with the state does not imply endorsement of
the agent or approval of the contract.
3 84
Athlete-agents who violate North Carolina's rules are subject
to forfeiture of any right of repayment of anything of value the
agent may have given the athlete to induce the athlete to enter
into a representation or financial services contract.3 85 Moreover,
agents who transgress the regulations face the refunding of any
consideration paid to the agent by the athlete for the agent's ser-
vices.3886 Violators of North Carolina's regulations may also be sub-
ject to a civil fine of up to $25,000.387 Knowing violators of the laws
are guilty of a felony.88
17. Ohio
Ohio's athlete-agent regulations are considerably more relaxed
than similar statutes enacted in other states. 89 Ohio does not re-
strict the time in which agents may approach student-athletes.390
Agents may enter into representation contracts with student-ath-
letes at any time, provided that the contract is put in writing and
submitted to the director of the student's particular sports
program.3 91
In addition, Ohio excludes money management from its defini-
tion of an agent's activities. 92 The Ohio regulations define an
agent as anyone who solicits a representation agreement with, or
negotiates a professional sports contract for, a student-athlete.
3 93
Attorneys and members of the athlete's immediate family are ex-
381. Id. at § 78C-77.
382. Id. at § 78C-75(B).
383. Id. at § 78C-75(B)(3).
384. Id. at § 78C-75(B)(1).
385. Id. at § 78C-75(A)(1).
386. Id. at § 78C-75(A)(2).
387. Id. at § 78C-79.
388. Id. at § 78C-78(C).
389. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4771.01-.99 (Anderson Supp. 1989).
390. Id. at § 4771.02.
391. Id.
392. Id. at § 4771.01(A).
393. Id. at § 4771.01(B).
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empted from the statute's definition of athlete-agent.3 94 Thus,
under the Ohio statute, a student-athlete has no protection what-
soever from an agent if the agent is an attorney or a relative.
Criminal violations of Ohio's regulations are classified as first
degree misdemeanors. 95 Civil penalties can be assessed up to
$10,000, however, an agent need not put up any money as surety." '9
18. Oklahoma
The Oklahoma Athlete Agent Act (Oklahoma Act) requires
athlete-agents to register with the Oklahoma Secretary of State
before contacting any Oklahoma NCAA athlete or any Oklahoma
non-NCAA athlete who has never signed a professional sports con-
tract in the state. 97 An applicant's registration may be denied on
the basis of his or her professional background, 398 and registration
must be renewed annually.399 Registered agents must pay an an-
nual filing fee of $1000.00 Additionally, registered agents must post
a $100,000 surety bond or carry $100,000 worth of professional lia-
bility insurance.'
The Oklahoma Act limits the amount of fees an agent may
collect for professional services, but this limit only applies to a nar-
row spectrum of athletes."" Represented by the amount the ath-
lete actually earns during the relevant year, the limitation applies
only to multi-year contracts negotiated for non-NCAA athletes
who have never before signed an employment contract with a pro-
fessional sports team.0 3
Oklahoma specifically prohibits agents from offering "anything
of value" to induce any Oklahoma non-NCAA athlete who has
never previously signed a professional sports contract to enter into
a representation contract. 0 4 Curiously, the Oklahoma Act does not
394. Id. at § 4771.01(C). The Michigan statute also exempts family members. See
supra note 335 and accompanying text.
395. Id. at § 4771.99.
396. Id. at § 4771.05(B).
397. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 821.62(A)(1)-(2) (West 1989). Note that the
Oklahoma Act, like the California Athlete Agencies Act, excepts Oklahoma attorneys from
registration requirements.
398. Id. at § 821.62(C)(3).
399. Id. at § 821.62(D).
400. Id. at § 821.62(E).
401. Id. at § 821.62(G).
402. Id. at § 821.63(D).
403. Id.
404. Id. at § 821.64(7).
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offer the same protection to Oklahoma NCAA athletes.0 5 The
Oklahoma Act also forbids registered agents from selling or trans-
ferring interests in their athlete without the Secretary of State's
permission, 40 6 and from publishing any false representations to
athletes.0 7
Sanctions for violating the Oklahoma Act include fines, re-
funds of any fees paid on behalf of the athlete to his or her agent,
and criminal penalties. 0 8 Criminal penalties under the Oklahoma
Act consist of, among other things, imprisonment of up to one
year.40
9
The Oklahoma Act suffers from the same restrictions that
limit the effectiveness of the California statute, namely, the nar-
rowness of the scope of regulated agents' activities. Under the
Oklahoma Act, agent activities may include contract negotiation
and representation solicitation, but exclude investment counseling
and finance management.410 Thus, as in the California legislation,
Oklahoma agents face no sanctions for mismanaging or embezzling
their athlete's finances.
19. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's regulatory statute, passed in 1988, defines ath-
lete-agent as anyone who recruits a person to enter into an agent
representation contract or attempts to procure employment for
someone as a professional athlete.'1
Pennsylvania does-not require registration of athlete-agents." 2
However, the statute prohibits contracting with, or promising or
offering anything to, a student or his or her family before the stu-
dent's athletic eligibility for college athletics expires.4" The statute
also prevents agents from offering or giving anything "of value" to
college or university employees in exchange for referrals of stu-
dents to the agent. 4
Violation of the Pennsylvania statute is a misdemeanor crime,
subject to fines or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
405. Id.
406. Id. at § 821.64(1).
407. Id. at § 821.64(2).
408. Id. at §§ 821.66(A)(1)(3), 821.66(C).
409. Id. at § 821.66(C).
410. Id. at § 821.61(A)(2).
411. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107(c) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1990).
412. Id. at § 7107.
413. Id. at § 7107(a)(1)-(2).
414. Id. at § 7107(a)(3).
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both. The fines imposed are not more than $10,000, or an amount
equal to three times the amount offered as an incentive to the stu-
dent-athlete or the school employee, whichever is greater.415
20. South Carolina
South Carolina classifies an athlete-agent as a person who re-
cruits or solicits a student-athlete to enter into an agent contract,
or who, for a fee, attempts to obtain employment for a student-
athlete with a professional sports team or as a professional ath-
lete.416 Agents must register biennially with the South Carolina
Department of Consumer Affairs. 7 The statute's only registration
requirement is a biennial fee of $300.4 1' Violation of the registra-
tion requirements, however, is a felony under South Carolina law,
punishable by a fine of up to $5000, or imprisonment for up to five
years, or both.419
Athlete-agents in South Carolina may not offer "anything of
value" to induce a student-athlete to enter into a representation
agreement with the agent.1'2 South Carolina also specifically pro-
hibits offering, or agreeing to offer anything of value to any em-
ployee of a school in return for referring student-athletes to an
agent.""
Contracts entered into between athlete-agents and athletes
must specifically warn the student-athlete that, by entering into
such contract, the athlete may lose his or her eligibility to compete
in intercollegiate athletics.422 Both agents and athletes who sign
contracts before the completion of the athlete's last intercollegiate
contract, including post-season games, must notify the athlete's
school within seventy-two hours of the signing of the contract. "2"
Student-athletes who sign an agreement with an athlete-agent
may rescind the agreement within ten days of the signing of the
contract.42' The student-athlete, however, must repay any money
(other than travel, lodging, meal, and entertainment expenses)
415. Id. at § 7107(b).
416. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-10(2) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
417. Id. at § 59-102-20(A).
418. Id.
419. Id. at § 59-102-20(C).
420. Id. at § 59-102-40(4).
421. Id. at § 59-102-40(2)(3).
422. Id. at § 59-102-30(D).
423. Id. at § 59-102-30(A)-(B).
424. Id. at § 59-102-30(G).
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given by the agent to the athlete.2 5
Agents and student-athletes who do not notify the athlete's
school of their contractual relationship are liable for any damages
to the school resulting from the athlete's ineligibility.'26 In addi-
tion, damages may be assessed in an amount equal to three times
the value of the scholarship given to the athlete during the ath-
lete's eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics.427
21. Tennessee
Tennessee's athlete-agent regulations essentially put teeth
into the NCAA's regulations. 428 The Tennessee statute provides
that a "person who causes, aids, or abets a student-athlete or insti-
tution, or both, to violate or be in violation of a rule or rules of its
governing national collegiate athletic association" liable to the ath-
lete's school for damages.4 29 To be liable for damages, the violator
must have acted with scienter.'30 In addition, the violation must
have caused either the loss of eligibility of the agent's athlete, or
disciplinary action against the school by the NCAA."3'
Violators of NCAA regulations may be liable, under the Ten-
nessee statute, for "[1]ost television revenues, lost ticket sales of
regular season athletic events, and lost revenues from not qualify-
ing for post season athletic events, such as football bowl games and
tournaments[.]' ' ,2 Additionally, violators may be held liable for
money "received for post-season participation" which had to be re-
turned or forfeited by a school due to disqualifications caused by
the violator's actions.3 3 Such violators may also be assessed dam-
ages in an amount equal to three times the value of the athletic
scholarship furnished by the institution during the student-ath-
lete's period of eligibility.4 34
Tennessee also requires that representation agreements follow
statutory guidelines. 4 35 Agent contracts must clearly and expressly
inform the athlete that signing the contract will result in forfeiture
425. Id.
426. Id. at § 59-102-30(F).
427. Id.
428. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-2101 to -2109 (1989).
429. Id. at § 49-7-2103(a).
430. Id. at § 49-7-2103(a)(1). This Section states: "The person knew or reasonably
should have known that a rule was violated or would be violated .
431. Id. at §8 49-7-2103(a)(2)(A) to 49-7-2103(a)(2)(B).
432. Id. at § 49-7-2106(1).
433. Id. at § 49-7-2106(2).
434. Id. at § 49-7-2107.
435. Id. at § 49-7-2104.
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of his or her eligibility to compete in intercollegiate athletics. 38
The contract must tell the athlete that he or she has twenty days
to rescind the contract.437 Attempted waivers of this right to re-
scind are ineffective.43 8 To be valid, copies of the contract must be
sent to the athlete's school.439
Agents who violate Tennessee's contractual regulations face
the voiding of the agent-athlete representation agreement, and the
forfeiture of any money paid to the athlete to induce him or her to
sign the representation contract.40
22. Texas
Texas' regulation of athlete-agents requires agents to register
with the Texas Secretary of State before contacting any athletes
located in the state.441 The Secretary may take into consideration
the applicant's formal training, practical experience, and educa-
tional background in deciding whether to register the applicant. 4 2
All athlete-agents must reapply for registration yearly.443
Under the Texas statute, all representation contracts must
state, inter alia, that the agent is registered with, but not endorsed
by, the State of Texas."' All representation contracts must also
disclose the amount of money the agent is receiving for his or her
services." 5
The Texas statute forbids athlete-agents from contacting stu-
dent-athletes at state colleges before the athlete's last collegiate
game.4" In addition, the athlete-agent may not offer "anything of
value" to induce the athlete to sign a representation contract with
the athlete-agent." 7
Sanctions for violating the Texas statute include the civil pen-
alty of fines not exceeding $10,000.448 Criminal penalties include
restitution of any fees paid to the agent by the athlete, the voiding
of all the agent's representation contracts under the statute, and a
436. Id. at § 49-7-2104(b)(2).
437. Id.
438. Id. at § 49-7-2104(b)(5)(B).
439. Id. at § 49-7-2104(b)(2).
440. Id. at § 49-7-2104(b)(10)(B).
441. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(a) (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1991).
442. Id. at § 2(b)(3).
443. Id. at §§ 2(d)-(e).
444. Id. at § 5(b).
445. Id. at § 5(c).
446. Id. at § 6(b)(5).
447. Id. at § 6(b)(4).
448. Id. at §§ 9(a)-(b).
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prison sentence of up to one year.' 4 '
Agent activities are defined more broadly under the Texas
statute than under the California and Oklahoma Acts. Under the
Texas statute, the activities of a sports agent include financial ser-
vices, representation solicitation, as well as contract negotiation.450
Thus, the Texas statute, unlike the California 18 and Oklahoma 452
Acts, offers athletes protection from agents mishandling the ath-
letes' finances.
23. Virginia
Virginia defines athlete-agent as anyone who recruits an ath-
lete to enter into a representation contract or who, for compensa-
tion, attempts to procure employment for an athlete with a profes-
sional sports team. 45  All athlete-agents must be licensed by the
Virginia Department of Commerce.' 5 '
To receive or renew a Virginia license, athlete-agents must
comply with a number of requirements. 55 Agents must post a
bond of $100,000, or provide the state Department of Commerce
with proof that they carry professional liability insurance in the
same amount. 4' Agents must also provide the state with the
names of all athletes the agent represents or has represented. 457
They must inform the state of all persons who have a financial in-
terest in the business dealings of the athlete-agent. 4 8 Furthermore,
athlete-agents must disclose to the state information concerning
their educational and professional backgrounds.' 5
The Department of Commerce requires that all athlete-agents
file annually business records revealing the names of the athletes
the agents represent, the fee received from each client, and the
specific services provided for each athlete.460 Athlete-agent licenses
must also be renewed annually.' 61
Registered Virginia athlete-agents may not offer student- ath-
449. Id. at §3 8(a)(1)-(4)(c).
450. Id. at 33 1(a)(2)-(3).
451. See supra notes 227, 229.
452. See supra note 397.
453. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-518.A (1990).
454. Id. at § 54.1-519A
455. Id. at §§ 54.1-519, 54.1-524.
456. Id. at § 54.1-519(F).
457. Id. at 33 54.1-519(C)(4)-(5).
458. Id. at 3 54.1-519(C)(6).
459. Id. at 3 54.1-519(C)(3).
460. Id. at 3 54.1-524.
461. Id. at § 54.1-519(D).
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letes "anything of value," except "reasonable entertainment and
transportation expenses," to induce the athlete to enter into a rep-
resentation contract with the agent.462 Athlete-agents are also pre-
cluded from splitting a fee with anyone at a Virginia college or uni-
versity for referring a potential client to an agent.' 3
Generally, agents are forbidden from approaching college ath-
letes to discuss agent representation or employment procurement
until after the athlete's last intercollegiate contest, including post-
season games. 64 However, if a school allows agents to conduct on-
campus interviews, agents may discuss representation or employ-
ment, subject to the rules of the individual school allowing the
interviews. 46 5
Representation contracts signed by Virginia college athletes
must be filed with the Virginia Department of Commerce, and
with the student-athlete's school."' Any contract signed by a col-
lege athlete may be terminated, at the athlete's option, within ten
days after the signing of such contract.467
Agents who violate Virginia's regulations face repayment of
any consideration paid to the agent by the athlete for the agent's
services, and reimbursement to the athlete for reasonable attor-
ney's fees if the athlete sues the agent for a violation of these regu-
lations.4" Any contract negotiated by an agent who violated any
Virginia regulation is held void.69
VII. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Representative John Bryant of Texas has introduced a bill to
federally regulate sports agents. 7 0 The proposal in effect assigns
regulatory powers and duties to "agency associations," groups of
government-approved professional sports agents.'71
The proposed legislation defines a sports agent as someone
who enters into a representation contract with an athlete, advises
an athlete concerning advertisements or public appearances, or
462. Id. at § 54.1-521(A)(7).
463. Id. at § 54.1-521(A)(6).
464. Id. at § 54.1-521(A)(8).
465. Id. at § 54.1-522.
466. Id. at § 54.1-520.
467. Id.
468. Id. at § 54.1-523(A)(2).
469. Id. at § 54.1-523(B).
470. See H.R. 4842, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). The proposed legislation is included
in this Article as an appendix [hereinafter Appendix].
471. Appendix, supra note 470, at Section 5.
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who manages an athlete's money. 72 Relatives of an athlete by
blood or marriage, however, are excepted from the legislation's
definition.473
The bill prohibits sports agents from using the mails or any
other means of interstate commerce to effect any transaction con-
cerning an athlete without being registered with an agency
association.47'
Under the proposed legislation, all agency associations would
have to be approved by the Secretary of Commerce. 475 Associations
would have the power to examine and verify the character and
qualifications of applicants. 76 Associations could revoke or sus-
pend the registration of agents who violate the association's stan-
dards or regulations.
Edward Vincent King, Jr., Esquire, of San Francisco, has sug-
gested numerous changes to the proposed federal legislation. 77
King proposes additions to the current registration requirements
of character investigation, supporting affidavits, and application
disclosure. 4' 8 According to King, the federal legislation should re-
quire malpractice insurance, bonding requirements, and contribu-
tions to a fraud reimbursement fund.479 The fund reimbursement
contributions could be taken from agent registration fees.'80
King would also add broader disclosure requirements to the
personal information already required by the proposed federal leg-
islation.'81 Under King's proposal, student-athletes would report
all agent contracts to their respective schools, under threat of fine,
scholarship revocation, or expulsion. 82 All athlete-agent contacts
would be reported to an athlete's school.'8 3 Agents would be re-
quired to identify, yearly, their employees, associates, and indepen-
472. Id. at Section 3.
473. Id. at Section 3(11).
474. Id. at Section 6(a).
475. Id. at Section 4.
476. Id. at Section 5.
477. Monograph of Edward Vincent King, Jr., on the proposed federal Sports Agent
Act (September 24, 1990) [hereinafter King Monograph]. On several occasions King has suc-
cessfully litigated on behalf of athletes against their former agents for breach of fiduciary
duties, including malpractice. Interview with Edward Vincent King, Jr., Esq., in Madison,
Wisconsin (August 11, 1990).
478. Appendix, supra note 470, at Section 5, 19-22.
479. King Monograph, supra note 477, at 3-4.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 4.
482. Id.
483. Id.
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dent contractors. 4
King also suggests that any proposed federal sports agent leg-
islation make several athlete-protective assumptions.'85 Under the
legislation, all athletes should be assumed to be "unsophisticated"
in business matters.' 86 Furthermore, all documents signed by an
athlete represented by an agent should be presumed to have been
signed in reliance upon the agent's advice. 87 Finally, the federal
statute should presume the broadest possible fiduciary relationship
between athlete and agent.'88
King offers two proposals to eliminate difficulties in the reso-
lution of athlete-agent disputes.'89 First, King suggests that federal
regulation provide that agents who conduct business within a cer-
tain state constructively consent to jurisdiction within that partic-
ular state.'90 Second, arbitration, with full discovery and subpoena
power, should be mandatory for athlete-agent disputes.' 9'
To encourage the private enforcement of the federal regula-
tions, King recommends that attorneys' fees be provided for in
successful actions. 92 Additionally, King suggests punitive and/or
treble damages be made available to successful athlete plaintiffs. 9 3
According to King, all agent contracts should be voidable at
the athlete's option in the event of agent failure to comply with the
relevant federal requirements.' 9 ' When such a contract is voidable,
the affected agent should be allowed no equitable relief or quan-
tum meruit recovery. 95 King believes that broader damages and
voidable contract options would provide greater deterrence to
agent abuses than the current federal proposals of registration rev-
ocation and/or yearly suspension. 96
VIII. CONCLUSION
Given the fact that representation of athletes transcends state
lines, it is burdensome to require agents to register in every state.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 2.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 2.
490. Id. at 1-2.
491. Id. at 2.
492. Id. at 3.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id. Appendix, supra note 470, at Section 7.
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Consequently, federal regulation of sports agents would provide
uniformity, efficiency, and consistency in this area. State statutes
regulating sports agents vary not only in their scope, but also in
their approach to enforcement. With the exception of Alabama,
which aggressively prosecutes sports agents who break its laws, the
majority of states have not routinely pursued violators. For exam-
ple, California enacted its law requiring agents to register in
1989."" To date only twenty-four have registered pursuant to that
law.498
Moreover, societal priorities such as drugs and violent crime,
spirit the states' resources away from sports agent regulatory en-
forcement. Failure to enforce state laws merely encourages the law-
lessness of agents who continually flaunt contempt for state
regulations.
Self-regulation and education are possible alternatives to fed-
eral legislation. To this end, Ed Garvey, the former executive di-
rector of the National Football League Player's Association, has
developed SportSeminars and educational conferences dealing with
representation of professional athletes.""' The idea behind Sport-
Seminars was to train professionals who represent athletes. 00
Through numerous seminars around the country, Garvey's group
found plenty of professionals who wanted to represent athletes. 0 1
However, one glaring problem existed-those professionals could
not get clients.502 The problem was due in part to ethical restraints
and because some of the athletes were offered substantial entice-
ments to sign with certain agents.5 03 As a result, Garvey's group
decided that it needed a more intensive training program for the
professionals, a required examination, and a certification
program. °4
Furthermore, SportSeminars decided it had to attack the
problem from both ends, and had to get to the athletes as well.
Consequently, Garvey and a few college officials began speaking to
497. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1528 (West Supp. 1989).
498. Interview with Edward Vincent King, Jr., Esq., in Madison, Wisconsin (August
11, 1990).
499. Interview with Ed Garvey, in Madison, Wisconsin (August 12, 1990).
500. Working materials from the Second Annual Sports Law Institute Sports Semi-
nars at the University of Wisconsin Law School 8 (August 9-12, 1990).
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id. These programs would help assure potential clients that their certified profes-
sionals carried a working knowledge of the Sports Law field. Interview with Ed Garvey, in
Madison, Wisconsin (August 12, 1990).
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various student-athletes.50 5 Although the athlete often understood
the pitfalls of signing with any agent, the vital link between
trained professionals and those athletes was missing.5
06
The objective of SportSeminars is to encourage athletes to
hire professionals by informing athletes of the services a contract
negotiator can provide, defining the reasonable fee, and explaining
the means by which athletes can find a competent professional.50 7
The main purpose is to provide the athletes an opportunity to
"find a talented representative who plays within the rules." 508 The
ultimate goal of Garvey's organization is to provide athletes whose
eligibility has expired with competent professional representa-
tives .50  Given the fact that many agents pay or "loan" athletes
money to have the athlete retain them, the question remains will
this approach work?
505. Interview with Ed Garvey, in Madison, Wisconsin (August 12, 1990).
506. Working materials from the Second Annual Sports Law Institute SportSeminars
at the University of Wisconsin Law School 9 (August 9-12, 1990).
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
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APPENDIX
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A BILL
To provide for the regulation of sports agents operating in in-
terstate commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable
and unfair practices in athletics, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Professional Sports Agency Act
of 1989".
SECTION 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that -
(1) the practice of sports agency entails a national public in-
terest which makes it necessary to (A) provide for regulation and
control of such practices and related matters; (B) assure that
sports agents follow honest practices, adhere to professional re-
sponsibilities, and maintain educational and ethical standards; and
(C) assure that clients of sports agents receive the highest levels of
service consistent with licensed professional practice;
(2) current law does not provide for the licensing and regula-
tion of independent contractors who (A) seek to recruit or solicit
professional athletes to enter into agency contracts; (B) represent
professional athletes entering into professional sports services con-
tracts or various marketing arrangements; or (C) administer the
funds received by such athletes through such activities;
(3) sports (A) are enjoyed by the general public throughout
the United States; (B) are affected by means of the mails and in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce; and (C) constitute an im-
portant part of the current of interstate commerce;
(4) sports contracts often are affected by means of the mails
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and parties to such
contracts and sports agents involved in such contracts frequently
are located in diverse States; and
(5) sports agency and the solicitation of sports agency and
sports contracts, marketing arrangements, and the administration
of funds for professional athletes are often susceptible to impropri-
ety, to the detriment of the general public, and athletes and athlet-
ics in general.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act the following terms have the following
[Vol. 8:1
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meanings:
(1) The term "active representation" means the rendering of
the following services (or holding one's self out as available to
render such services) to or for an athlete:
(A) Soliciting, entering into, or negotiating an agency
contract.
(B) Soliciting, negotiating, or advising or consulting with an
athlete regarding a sports contract.
(C) Soliciting, negotiating, or advising or consulting with an
athlete regarding an advertisement, public appearance, endorse-
ment, or similar arrangement for, on behalf of, or with respect to,
an athlete.
(D) Managing or handling funds belonging to an athlete, ex-
cept where all services rendered constitute (i) investment advisory
services rendered by an investment advisor registered with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission or pursuant to the exemption
under section 202(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. 80b-2(11)); (ii) banking or trust services rendered by a bank
or a licensed trust company; or (iii) legal services rendered by a
licensed attorney, where all funds are held or maintained in a trust
fund established by the attorney or his firm; however, nothing in
this paragraph shall be interpreted to exclude attorneys from the
applicability of the other provisions of this subsection.
(2) The term "agency contract" means any oral or written con-
tract, transaction, or arrangement, pursuant to which a person is,
or purports to be authorized or empowered as, a sports agent.
(3) The term "associated with" means having a legal affiliation
or employment relationship.
(4) The term "athlete" means any person who participates or
who is engaged in discussion which may reasonably be expected to
result in participation, in professional sporting events or with pro-
fessional sports teams.
(5) The term "national sports agency association" means any
association of sports agents which has been approved by and regis-
tered with the Secretary as a national sports agency association
pursuant to the requirements and guidelines set forth in this Act.
(6) The term "professional sporting event" means a sport con-
test, game, competition, or exhibition, taking place within the
United States, where at least one of the participants is paid, remu-
nerated, or compensated for the participant's services, or who may,
if successful, win financial or valuable prizes (other than a reduc-
tion or elimination of college tuition).
(7) The term "professional sports team" means any organiza-
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tion, association, corporation, or other commercial or legal entity-
(A) engaged in regular or periodic athletic competition or exhi-
bition which takes place within the United States as part of a
league or system of inter-team competition, or
(B) which pays, remunerates, or otherwise provides compensa-
tion or financial or valuable prizes (other than a reduction or elimi-
nation of college tuition) to some or all of those participating in
such competition.
(8) The term "registered agent" means a sports agent who has
been registered and certified as a sports agent by an approved and
registered national sports agency association, after having met that
association's standards and maintained the agent's certified status
in good standing.
(9) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce.
(10) The term "sports agency" means the business of acting as
a sports agent.
(11) The term "sports agent" means a person who conducts or
participated in (either directly or indirectly) active representation;
and such term does not include conduct or participation in active
representation by any person related to an athlete by blood or by
marriage.
(12) The term "sports contract" means any contract, transac-
tion, or arrangement whereby an athlete agrees to render services
as a participant or player to a professional sports team or as part
of a professional sporting event.
(13) The term "State" means any State of the United States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or any other terri-
tory or possession of the United States.
SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE.
(a) IN GENERAL. - The Secretary shall be responsible for
carrying out those functions specified as functions of the Secretary
under this Act.
(b) APPOINTMENT OF STAFF. - The Secretary may, sub-
ject to applicable provisions of title 5, United States Code, appoint
and fix the compensation of such attorneys, experts, and other em-
ployees as are necessary to carry out the Secretary's functions
under this Act.
(c) ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE. - The Secretary may des-
ignate (by regulation) an existing department, bureau or office, or
establish a new office, within the Department of Commerce for the
[Vol. 8:1
58
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol8/iss1/2
POLICING SPORTS AGENTS
purpose of administering the Secretary's functions under this Act.
(d) ASSISTANCE FROM NONFEDERAL ENTITIES. -
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, in accordance with
regulations which the Secretary shall promulgate under subsection
(e) to prevent conflicts of interest, the Secretary may accept pay-
ment and reimbursement, in cash or in kind, from non-Federal
agencies, organizations, and individuals for travel, subsistence, and
other necessary expenses incurred by employees of the Secretary
hired pursuant to this Act in attending meetings and conferences
related to functions of the Secretary under this Act. Any such pay-
ment or reimbursement shall be deposited in the Treasury and
credited to the appropriate account.
(e) PROMULGATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS.
- Any rules or regulations required or permitted to be promul-
gated by the Secretary under this Act shall be promulgated in ac-
cordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 5. NATIONAL SPORTS AGENCY ASSOCIATIONS.
(a) REGISTRATION OF NATIONAL SPORTS AGENCY
ASSOCIATIONS. - An association of sports agencies may be reg-
istered as a national sports agency association under the terms and
conditions provided in this section by filing with the Secretary an
application for registration, in such form as the Secretary may pre-
scribe, by rule. Such application shall contain the rules of the asso-
ciation and such other information and documents as the Secretary
may prescribe, by rule, as necessary to carry out this Act.
(b) ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR REGISTRATION. - An
association of sports agents shall not be registered as a national
sports agency association under this section unless the Secretary
determines that -
(1) the association is so organized and has the capacity to be
able to carry out the purposes of this Act and to comply, and to
enforce compliance by its members and persons associated with its
members, with the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to this Act, and the rules of the association;
(2) subject to section 6, the rules of the association provide
that any sports agent is eligible to become a member of such
association;
(3) the rules of the association assure a fair representation of
its members in the selection of its directors and the administration
of its affairs and provide that one or more directors shall be repre-
sentative of athletes and not be, or be associated with, a sports
agent;
(4) the rules of the association provide for the equitable allo-
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cation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its
members;
(5) the rules'of the association are designed to (A) prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, promote just and
equitable principles of conduct and fair dealings, and foster coop-
eration and coordination among athletes, sports agents, profes-
sional sports teams, sponsors of professional sporting events, and
educational institutions; (B) mitigate abuses in sports contracts
and services provided by sports agents; and (C) protect athletes
and the public interest;
(6) the rules of the association are not designed-
(A) to permit unfair discrimination among athletes, sports
agents, professional sports teams, sponsors of professional sporting
events, or educational institutions,or
(B) to regulate, by virtue of any authority contained in this
Act, matters not related to the purposes of this Act or the adminis-
tration of the association;
(7) the rules of the association provide that (subject to any
rule or order of the Secretary pursuant to section 6) its members
[and persons associated with such members] shall be appropriately
disciplined for violation of the provisions of this Act, any rules or
regulations promulgated under this Act, or the rules of the associa-
tion, by expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions,
and operations, fine, censure, suspension or prohibition from asso-
ciation with a member, or any other appropriate sanction;
(8) the rules of the association are'consistent with subsection
(d), and there are fair procedures for (A) disciplining members and
persons associated with such members; (B) denial of membership
to any person seeking membership; (C) barring of any person from
becoming associated with a member; and (D) prohibition or limita-
tion by the association of any person with respect to access to ser-
vices offered by the association or a member of the association;
[(9) the rules of the association do not impose any burden on
competition not necessary or appropriate to further the purposes
of this Act;] and
(10) the rules of the association do not unduly conflict with
those of any previously registered association in a manner which
would make compliance by a prospective member with such con-
flicting rules difficult.(c) MEMBERSHIP RESTRICTED. 
- (1) A national sports
agency association shall deny membership to any person other
than a natural person or any natural person who is not, or is not
associated with, a registered sports agent.
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(2) A national sports agency association may or, where the
Secretary directs (by order) as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of athletes a national sports
agency association, shall deny membership to any sports agent or
natural person associated with a sports agent, and bar becoming
associated with a member, any person who is subject to a statutory
disqualification. A national sports agency association shall file no-
tice with the Secretary not less than 30 days before admitting any
person to membership or permitting any person to become associ-
ated with a member, if the association knew or, in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that such person was subject
to a statutory disqualification. Such notice shall be in such form
and contain such information as the Secretary, by rule, may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of athletes.
(3) A national sports agency association may deny member-
ship to, or condition the membership of, a sports agent, if-
(A) such sports agent does not meet such standards of finan-
cial responsibility or operational capability, or such sports agent,
or any natural person associated with such sports agent, does not
meet such standards of training, experience, and competence, as
are prescribed by the rules of the association; or
(B) such sports agent, or any natural person associated with
such sports agent, has engaged, and there is a reasonable likelihood
that such agent or person will again engage, in acts or practices
inconsistent with just and equitable rules of the association or con-
duct as a sports agent.
(4) A national sports agency association may examine and ver-
ify the qualifications of an applicant to become a member and any
natural persons associated with such an applicant, in accordance
with procedures established by the rules of the association.
(5) A national sports agency association may bar a natural per-
son from becoming associated with a member, or condition the
membership of a member or the association of a natural person
with a member, if such associated person -
(A) does not meet such standards of training, experience, and
competence as are prescribed by the rules of the association; or
(B) has engaged, or there is a reasonable likelihood such per-
son will again engage, in acts or practices inconsistent with just
and equitable rules of the association or conduct of a sports
agency.
(6) A national sports agency association may examine and ver-
ify the qualifications of an applicant to become a person associated
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with a member, in accordance with procedures established by the
rules of the association. A national sports agency association may
require any person associated with a member, or any class of such
persons, to be registered with the association, in accordance with
procedures established by the rules of the association.
(7) A national sports agency association may bar any person
from becoming a member or a person associated with a member, if
such person does not agree, to the extent permitted by law, to-
(A) supply the association with such information with respect
to its relationship and dealings with the member or with the per-
son associated with the member, as the case may be, as is specified
in the rules of the association; and
(B) permit the examination of such person's books and records
to verify the accuracy of any such information.
(d) DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. - (1) In any proceed-
ing by a national sports agency association to determine whether a
member or person associated with a member should be disciplined
(other than a summary proceeding conducted pursuant to para-
graph (4)), the association -
(A) shall bring specific charges,
(B) shall notify such member or person of such charges,
(C) shall give such a member or person an opportunity to de-
fend against such charges, and
(D) shall keep a record of such proceeding.
(2) A determination by the association to impose a disciplinary
sanction on such member or person shall be supported by a state-
ment setting forth -
(A) any act or practice in which such member or person associ-
ated with a member has been found to have engaged, or which
member or person has been found to have omitted;
(B) the specific provisions of this Act, any rules or regulations
promulgated pursuant to this Act, or of the rules of the association
which the association determines to have been violated; and
(C) the sanction imposed and the reasons for such sanction.
(3) In any proceeding by a national sports agency association
to determine whether a person shall be denied membership, barred
from becoming associated with a member, or prohibited or limited
with respect to access to services offered by the association or a
member of such association (other than a summary proceeding
pursuant to paragraph (4)), the association shall notify such person
of the specific grounds for denial, bar, or prohibition or limitation
under consideration. Such person shall be afforded an opportunity
for a hearing (which hearing may consist solely of the submission
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of affidavits or presentation of oral arguments) regarding such spe-
cific grounds. The association shall keep a record of such proceed-
ing. A determination by the association to deny membership, bar a
person from becoming associated with a member, or prohibit or
limit a person with respect to access to services offered by the asso-
ciation or a member of the association shall be supported by a
statement setting forth the specific grounds on which such denial,
bar, or prohibition or limitation is based.
(4) A national sports agency association may summarily sus-
pend a member if the association determines that such member is
in such financial or operating difficulty that the member cannot be
permitted to continue to do business as a member without jeopard-
izing athletes, other members of the association, the public, or the
association. The association shall notify the Secretary of such de-
termination. Any person aggrieved by such summary suspension
shall promptly be afforded an opportunity for a hearing (which
hearing may consist solely of the submission of affidavits or pres-
entation of oral arguments). The Secretary shall keep a record of
such proceeding. The Secretary, by order, may stay any such sum-
mary suspension on the Secretary's own motion or upon applica-
tion by any person aggrieved by such order, if the Secretary deter-
mines summarily or after notice and opportunity for hearing
(which hearing may consist solely of the submission of affidavits or
presentation of oral arguments) that such stay is consistent with
the public interest and the protection of athletes.
(e) FIXED COMMISSIONS AND OTHER FEES PROHIB-
ITED. - No national sports agency association may impose any
schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or
other to be charged by its members. A national sports agency asso-
ciation may require its members to disclose all such commissions,
allowances, discounts or other fees to athletes or others, in such
manner and form as it may prescribe.
SEC. 6. REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF SPORTS
AGENTS.
(a) UNREGISTERED AGENT ACTIVITY PROHIBITED.
- (1) It shall be unlawful for any sports agent (other than a sports
agent whose business is exclusively intrastate and who does not
make use of any service of a national sports agency association) to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or at-
tempt to induce entry into, any agency contract or sports contract,
unless such agent is registered in accordance with subsection (b).
(2) The Secretary may, by a rule or an order the Secretary
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deems consistent with the public interest and the protection of
athletes, conditionally or unconditionally exempt from paragraph
(1) any sports agent or class of sports agents specified in such rule
or order.
(b) AGENCY TRANSACTIONS BY PERSONS NOT MEM-
BERS OF ASSOCIATIONS IS PROHIBITED. - It shall be un-
lawful for any sports agent required to register pursuant to this
Act to effect any transaction regarding any agency contract or
sports contract, or to induce the formation of any sports agency
contract or contract, unless such sports agent is a member of a na-
tional sports agency association, and is registered pursuant to this
section.
(c) AGENT MUST MEET STANDARDS OF CAPABILITY.
- (1) No registered sports agent shall effect any transaction in, or
induce the formation of, any agent contract or sports contract, un-
less such sports agent meets standards of capability, and such
sports agent and all natural persons associated with such sports
agent meet such standards of training, experience, competence,
and such other qualifications, as a national sports agency associa-
tion or the Secretary finds necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of athletes. A national sports agency
association shall establish such standards by rules which may spec-
ify that all or any part of such standards shall apply to any class of
sports agents and persons associated with such sports agents.
[NOTE: Contrast with section 5(e)]
(2) A national sports agency association may, by rule, pre-
scribe reasonable fees and charges to defray its costs in carrying
out this subsection, including fees for any test administered by
such association or under its direction. The Secretary may cooper-
ate with national sports agency associations in devising and ad-
ministering test. The Secretary may require registered sports
agents and persons associated with such sports agents to pass such
tests administered by or on behalf of any such association, and to
pay such association reasonable fees or charges to defray the costs
incurred by such association in administering such tests.
(d) ASSOCIATION REGISTRATION APPLICATION. -
(1)(A) A sports agent may register with a national sports agency
association by filing an application for registration. Such applica-
tion shall be in writing and in such form and contain the informa-
tion specified in paragraph (2) and such other information and
documents concerning such sports agent and any persons associ-
ated with such sports agent as the national sports agency associa-
tion or the Secretary, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appro-
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priate in the public interest or for the protection of athletes.
(B) Within 10 days after the date of filing of such application,
the national sports agency association shall deliver a copy of such
application to the Secretary. Within 45 days after the date of the
filing of such application, the national sports agency association
shall grant registration to the sports agent, or request the Secre-
tary to institute proceedings to determine whether registration
should be denied. Such proceedings shall include a notice of the
grounds for denials which are under consideration and shall afford
an opportunity for a hearing. The proceedings shall be concluded
within 120 days after the date of filing of such application. At the
conclusion of such proceedings, the Secretary shall, by order, grant
or deny such registration.
(C) The Secretary shall grant such registration if the Secretary
finds that the requirements of this section are satisfied. The Secre-
tary shall deny such registration, if the Secretary does not make
such a finding or if the Secretary finds that, if the application were
approved, the applicant's registration would be subject to suspen-
sion or revocation under section 7(a).
(2) An application filed under paragraph (1) shall contain all
of the following information:
(A) The name, home address, social security number, drivers
license number (and State), and professional license numbers and
(States) and date and place of birth of the applicant.
(B) The addresses where the applicant resided during the pre-
ceding 10 years.
(C) The street and number of the building or place where the
business of the applicant is to be conducted.
(D) All businesses or occupations engaged in by the applicant
for at least 5 years immediately preceding the date of application.
(E) The educational background of the applicant, including
names and locations of schools, dates of attendance, degrees or
courses taken, transcripts and faculty references.
(F) The results of any tests or examinations required by the
rule of the national sports agency association.
(G) Information regarding any arrests, indictments, convic-
tions, administrative hearings, professional license proceedings, or
civil litigation involving or regarding the applicant and all persons
(except bona fide clerical employees on stated salaries) who are fi-
nancially interested, either as partners, associates, bonus partici-
pants or profit sharers, in the operation of the sports agency in
question, together with the amount or basis of their respective
interests.
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(e) SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS REQUIRED. - Any such
application must be accompanied by affidavits of at least 2 [repu-
table] persons who have known or have been associated with the
applicant for a period of at least five years, and who are residents
of the city or county in which the applicant has resided during that
period or in which the business of the sports agent is to be con-
ducted. Such affidavits shall state that the applicant is a person of
good moral character, has a reputation for fair dealing, and has no
known history of civil or criminal proceedings or litigation or ad-
ministrative or licensing hearings or proceedings, except as noted
in the affidavit.
(f) CHARACTER INVESTIGATION. - Upon receipt of an
application under this section, a national sports agency association
shall investigate the character and responsibility of the applicant
and the premises designated in the application as the place in
which the business of the sports agent is to be conducted. If the
association requests the Secretary to institute proceedings to de-
termine whether registration should be denied, the association
shall forward to the Secretary the results of all such investigations.
(g) APPLICATION FOR SUCCESSOR AGENT. - An appli-
cation of a sports agent to be formed or organized may be made by
a sports agent to which the sports agent to be formed or organized
is to be the successor. Such application, in such form as the na-
tional sports agency association may, by rule, prescribe, shall con-
tain such information and documents concerning the applicant, the
successor, and any persons associated with the applicant or the
successor, as the national sports agency association may, by rule,
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of athletes. The grant or denial of registration to
such an applicant shall be in accordance with the procedures set
forth in subsection (d)(1). If the national sports agency association
approves such registration, the registration shall terminate on the
forty-fifth day after the effective date of such approval, unless
before such forty-fifth day the successor, in accordance with such
rules and regulations as the national sports agency association may
prescribe, notifies the national sports agency association that it has
become the applicant.
(h) DISAPPROVAL OF PREVIOUSLY REVOKED APPLI-
CATION. - No application shall be approved under this section if
a registration of the involved sports agent had been revoked within
3 years from the date of such application.
(i) INSPECTION OF PREMISES OF SPORTS AGENT. -
Within 6 months after the date of approval of an application under
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this section, the Secretary or, upon the authorization and direction
of the Secretary, a national sports agency association of which the
sports agent is a member, shall conduct an inspection of the prem-
ises where the business of the sports agent is conducted, to deter-
mine whether such business is being conducted in conformity with
this Act and any rules and regulations promulgated under this Act.
The Secretary may delay the inspections of any class of sports
agents for a period not to exceed an additional 6 months, if the
Secretary determines that such delay is necessary or appropriate.
(j) WITHDRAWAL FROM REGISTRATION. - Any regis-
tered sports agent may, upon such terms and conditions as the
Secretary considers necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of athletes, withdraw from registration by fil-
ing a written notice of withdrawal with the Secretary. If a national
sports agency association finds that any sports agent which is a
member of such association has ceased to do business as a sports
agent, the association may cancel the registration of such sports
agent by giving appropriate notice to the sports agent and the Sec-
retary. Such sports agent may make protest to the Secretary re-
garding such withdrawal, and the Secretary shall afford such sports
agent the opportunity for a hearing.
SEC. 7. LIMITATIONS.
(a) [DISCIPLINARY ACTION]. - The Secretary shall, by
order, upon the recommendation of a national sports agency asso-
ciation or on the Secretary's own initiative, censure or place limita-
tions on the activities, functions, or operations of any sports agent,
or suspend for a period not exceeding 12 months or revoke the re-
gistration of any sports agent, if the Secretary finds, on the record
after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that such censure, plac-
ing of limitations, suspension, or revocation is in the public inter-
est and that such sports agent (whether before or after becoming a
sports agent) or any person associated with such sports agent
(whether before or after becoming a sports agent)-
(1) was convicted, within ten years preceding the date of filing
of any application under section 6 or at any time after such filing,
of any felony or misdemeanor which the Secretary finds (A) in-
volved agency contracts or sports contracts (or similar arrange-
ments involving industries other than sports) and the taking of a
false oath, the making of a false statement, bribery, perjury, or
conspiracy to commit any such offense; (B) arose out of the con-
duct of the business of a sports agent, attorney, accountant, invest-
ment advisor, entertainment agent, business agent or consultant,
financial advisor, or fiduciary; or (C) involved the larceny, theft,
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robbery, extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, fraudulent concealment,
embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of
funds;
(2) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment
or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction from acting as a
sports agent or from engaging in or continuing any conduct or
practice in connection with conducting business as a sports agent,
or in connection with the establishment or conduct of any sports
contract;
(3) has willfully violated any provision of this Act, any rule or
regulation promulgated under this Act, any rule of a national
sports agency association, or any rule of the Secretary promulgated
under this Act;
(4) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-
duced, or procured the violation by any person of any provision of
this Act, any rule or regulation promulgated under this Act, any
rule of a national sports agency association, or any rule promul-
gated by the Secretary under this Act, or has failed reasonably to
supervise (in order to prevent violations of such statutes, rules, and
regulations) any person who has committed such a violation, if
such other person is subject to the supervision of such sports agent
or any person associated with such sports agent; or
(5) is subject to an order of the Secretary entered pursuant to
this subsection which bars or suspends the right of such person to
be associated with a sports agent.
For the purposes of paragraph (4), no person shall be consid-
ered to have failed reasonably to supervise any other person, if
there have been established procedures, and a system for applying
such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent
and detect (insofar as practicable) any such violation by such other
person, and if such person has reasonably discharged the duties
and obligations incumbent upon such person by reason of such
procedures and system without reasonable cause to believe that
noncompliance with such procedures and system exists.
(b) SUSPENSION OF REGISTRATION PENDING FINAL
DETERMINATION OF REVOCATION OF REGISTRATION. -
Pending a final determination whether any registration under this
section shall be revoked, the Secretary may, by order, suspend
such registration, if such suspension appears to the Secretary, after
notice and opportunity for a hearing, to be necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of athletes.
(c) DISCIPLINARY ACTION. - (1) The Secretary shall, by
order, upon the recommendation of a national sports agency asso-
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ciation or on the Secretary's own initiative, censure or place limita-
tions on the activities or functions of any person associated or
seeking to become associated with a sports agent, or suspend for a
period not exceeding 12 months or bar any such person from being
associated with a sports agent, if the Secretary finds, on the record
after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, that such censure,
placing of limitations, suspension, or bar is in the public interest
and that such person has been convicted of any offense specified in
subsection (a)(1) or has committed or omitted any act or omission
specified in subsection (a)(3) or (4).
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person as to whom such an
order is in effect willfully to become,. or to be, associated with a
sports agent, without the consent of the Secretary.
(3) It shall be unlawful for any sports agent to permit such a
person to become, or remain, a person associated with such sports
agent without the consent of the Secretary, if such sports agent
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of
such order.
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